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Irina D. Manta∗∗ 
Abstract 
The America Invents Act (AIA) was widely hailed as a remedy 
to the excessive number of patents that the Patent & Trademark 
Office issued, and especially ones that would later turn out to be 
invalid. In its efforts to eradicate “patent trolls” and fend off other 
ills, however, the AIA introduced serious constitutional problems 
that this Article brings to the fore. We argue that the AIA’s new 
“second-look” mechanisms in the form of Inter Partes Review 
(IPR) and Covered Business Method Review (CBMR) have greatly 
altered the scope of vested patent rights by modifying the 
boundaries of existing patents. The changes in the boundaries of 
the patent grant made it significantly more likely that the patent 
owner would see his patent invalidated. This new state of affairs 
has already reduced the value of some patents that were obtained 
before the AIA became effective, and further declines will likely 
follow. We show on the basis of constitutional takings 
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jurisprudence that the loss of value that some patent owners have 
suffered as a result of the new procedures—even if their patents 
have not been specifically subjected to them—potentially compare 
with physical takings and definitely fall under the umbrella of 
regulatory takings. The way to remedy these failings is for the 
government either to change its procedures or provide just 
compensation to the patent owners that received patents from the 
PTO before the enactment of the AIA. 
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I. Introduction 
This Article demonstrates for the first time that recent 
changes in patent law have yielded unconstitutional results by 
forcing a taking of patent owners’ property. We show that the 
new post-issuance proceedings under the America Invents Act 
(AIA)1 have occasioned a permanent reduction in the value of 
patents granted before the enactment of the Act. Patent owners 
have a colorable claim that this redrawing of the boundaries of 
their intellectual property resembles a physical taking, and they 
have an even stronger claim that they have suffered a regulatory 
taking without just compensation. We argue that the most 
straightforward solution to this significant problem is either to 
change the scope of post-issuance review procedures or to make 
pre-AIA patents ineligible for such review.2  
In 2011, after a decades-long debate, Congress enacted a 
series of patent reforms meant to decrease the cost of patent 
                                                                                                     
 1. Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (codified in scattered sections 
of 28 and 35 U.S.C.). 
 2. See infra Part VI (arguing that “only legislative or judicial intervention” 
can solve the takings issues raised by the AIA). 
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litigation, reduce the number of “dubious” or improperly granted 
patents, and increase the certainty of patent rights.3 The 
mechanism that Congress chose to accomplish these goals is an 
increase of power of the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO)4 to 
adjudicate certain patent disputes in quasi-judicial, yet 
ultimately administrative proceedings.5 Under the new post-
issuance review procedures, a number of challenges to patent 
validity can now be adjudicated in the PTO, rather than in court.6 
The objectives of the new system are faster and more consistent 
outcomes.7 These twin goals are supposed to be achieved by 
having an expert body of specialized Administrative Patent 
Judges adjudicate the disputes8 and imposing strict statutory 
deadlines on resolving the cases.9 Reduction in costs and increase 
                                                                                                     
 3. See Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284, 284 (2011) (noting that the bill 
was “to provide for patent reform”); Gregory Dolin, Dubious Patent Reform, 56 
B.C. L. REV. 881, 881–82 (2015) [hereinafter Dolin, Dubious Patent Reform] 
(noting Congress’s attempt to reform the patent system and the problems it was 
trying to address).  
 4. Prior to 1881, when trademark registration and examination were 
added to its functions, the PTO was known simply as the “Patent Office.” See Ty 
Halasz, Comment, The Game of the Name: Shortcomings in the Dual-Agency 
Review of Drug Trademarks and a Remedial Cure, 64 ADMIN. L. REV. 235, 241 
(2012) (describing the history of the patent office, beginning with the Patent Act 
of 1793).  
 5. See Sarah Tran, Policy Tailors and the Patent Office, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. 
REV. 487, 498–99 (2012) (describing how Congress gave the PTO wide discretion 
in the AIA to prioritize and adjudicate patent claims). 
 6. 35 U.S.C. §§ 301–329 (2012); H.R. REP. NO. 112-98, pt. 1, at 46–48 
(2011). 
 7. See id. at 38–40 (noting the purpose of the law); Jonathan Tamimi, 
Note, Breaking Bad Patents: The Formula for Quick, Inexpensive Resolution of 
Patent Validity, 29 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 587, 587 (2014) (expressing hope that 
these better outcomes will help stop some of the “innovation-stifling” effects of 
the previous system). 
 8. See PersonalWeb Techs., LLC v. Facebook, Inc., No. 5:13-CV-01356-
EJD, 2014 WL 116340, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 13, 2014) (“Indeed, allowing these 
invalidity arguments to be determined once, employing the specialized expertise 
of the PTO, produces the exact results—avoiding duplicative costs and efforts 
and averting the possibility of inconsistent judgments—intended by the AIA and 
previous procedures.”). 
 9. See Andrew Byrnes, Standing Sentinel over Innovation: The Importance 
of a Balanced and Effective IP System, 18 CHAP. L. REV. 617, 628 (2015) (noting 
how the procedures allowed by the AIA are faster than those in the federal court 
system). 
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in speed, however, were not the only aims of the 2011 AIA 
reforms.10 Instead, much of the debate was focused on the 
problem of so-called “patent trolls” or entities whose business 
model is not the in-house production of tangible goods but rather 
the licensing of their inventions who engage in such production.11 
Congress was convinced that “patent trolls” are a significant 
drain on the economy and that measures must be taken to reduce 
the ability of the “trolls” to “blackmail” other companies into 
payments of supposedly unwarranted licensing fees.12 Congress 
became convinced that many issued patents should have never 
seen the light of day13 and that the PTO needed a “toolbox of new 
or fortified proceedings in which it may weed out low quality 
patents.”14  
To accomplish this goal, Congress created a set of new 
administrative review procedures housed in the PTO.15 These 
procedures, often collectively referred to as “post-issuance 
proceedings,” ostensibly allow the PTO to correct its own 
mistakes in issuing a patent in the first place.16 In creating these 
                                                                                                     
 10. See Tracie L. Bryant, Note, The America Invents Act: Slaying Trolls, 
Limiting Joinder, 25 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 687, 688 (2012) (noting that the AIA 
wanted to stop patent trolls and change some of the rules for joinder). 
 11. See id. (discussing how patent trolls are commonly criticized as 
reducing American innovation); Jared A. Smith & Nicholas R. Transier, Trolling 
for an NPE Solution, 7 HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L.J. 215, 222 (2015) (noting that 
the Executive Branch has worked to stop patent trolls). 
 12. See Bryant, supra note 10, at 694 (describing the elements of the AIA); 
Aria Soroudi, Defeating Trolls: The Impact of Octane and Highmark on Patent 
Trolls, 35 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 319, 323 (2015) (describing how these “patent 
trolls” acquire the patents that they use to “blackmail” other companies). For a 
discussion on how “patent trolls” can supposedly “blackmail” their targets, see 
generally Robert P. Merges, The Trouble with Trolls: Innovation, Rent-Seeking, 
and Patent Law Reform, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1583, 1588 (2009). 
 13. See, e.g., 157 CONG. REC. S7413 (daily ed. Nov. 14, 2011) (statement of 
Sen. Kyl) (arguing that the AIA is needed to get rid of the “worst patents, which 
probably never should have been issued”). 
 14. Tran, supra note 5, at 498–99. 
 15. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 301–329 (2012) (outlining the requirements for 
reviewing patent applications); Dolin, Dubious Patent Reform, supra note 3, at 
913–23 (describing the procedures). 
 16. See Note, Recasting the U.S. International Trade Commission’s Role in 
the Patent System, 126 HARV. L. REV. 2337, 2342 (2013) (“The AIA overhaul was 
expressly designed to address the endemic problem of low patent quality 
outlined in the introduction to this Note by better empowering the PTO as a 
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new mechanisms, Congress insisted on speed by providing a 
specific deadline for completion of each post-issuance 
proceeding17 but left all other details of design and 
implementation to the PTO.18  
The procedures adopted by the PTO—in conjunction with the 
congressional abrogation of the “clear and convincing” standard 
for declaring a patent invalid in the context of post-issuance 
proceedings19—have had a serious effect on the value of patents 
to their owners, and for good reason.20 The economic value of a 
patent must take into account the chance that the patent itself 
will be declared invalid during litigation.21 That chance is almost 
never zero, even with respect to the “strongest,” most innovative 
                                                                                                     
forum for invalidating bad patents.”).  
 17. See 35 U.S.C. § 316(a)(11) (requiring the director to issue all final 
determinations within one year, except when the director extends the period by 
six months for good cause); id. § 326(a)(11) (laying out the same timeline 
requirements for post-grant review); Leahy–Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. 
No. 112-29, § 18(a)(1), 125 Stat. 284, 330 (2011) (describing the mechanisms for 
the various proceedings); Dolin, Dubious Patent Reform, supra note 3, at 909 
(describing the limitations of these proceedings). The America Invents Act 
required CMBR to be conducted under the same rules as PGR. Thus, all 
citations to the rules governing the conduct of PGR apply with equal force to 
CBMR. See Leahy–Smith America Invents Act § 18(a)(1), 125 Stat. at 330 
(requiring that CMBR “be regarded as, and shall employ the standards and 
procedures of, a post-grant review”). To avoid unnecessary prolixity, whenever 
there are no differences between PGR and CBMR, we cite to the relevant 
provision governing the conduct of PGR. 
 18. See 35 U.S.C. § 316(a) (requiring the Director of the PTO to prescribe 
regulations for the conduct of the IPR); id. § 326(a) (requiring the same for the 
conduct of PGR and CBMR). 
 19. See id. § 316(e) (establishing a “preponderance of the evidence” 
standard for declaring a patent invalid in IPR); id. § 326(e) (requiring the same 
for PGR and CBMR).  
 20. See Brief for 3M Co. et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Cuozzo Speed 
Technologies LLC’s Petition for Rehearing en banc, In re Cuozzo Speed Techs., 
LLC, 793 F.3d 1297, 1304 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 29, 2015) (noting that the court’s 
decision goes against “sound patent policy”); Jennifer L. Case, How the America 
Invents Act Hurts American Inventors and Weakens Incentives to Innovate, 82 
UMKC L. REV. 29, 67 (2013) (explaining how innovation is stifled when 
inventors have low confidence in acts like the AIA).  
 21. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Mark Janis & Mark A. Lemley, 
Anticompetitive Settlement of Intellectual Property Disputes, 87 MINN. L. REV. 
1719, 1761 (2003) (discussing how settlement negotiations can be hampered). 
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and thoroughly examined patents.22 The higher the chance that 
the patent is invalid, the lower the value of the patent to the 
patentee,23 and the lower the price he will obtain in any licensing 
or sale of that patent.24 Consequently, making a patent easier to 
invalidate necessarily reduces the value of that patent.25 This 
would not present a problem if the rule change were prospective 
only, meaning if the lower standard applied only to patents 
issued after the effective date of the AIA.26 Though the wisdom of 
making issued patents easier to invalidate can be debated,27 a 
prospective rule change would allow the inventors, investors, 
patent applicants, and patentees to adjust their behavior and 
investment decisions based on the known projected return on 
their investment.28 Yet, when the rules are changed retroactively, 
such as when already issued patents are subject to new 
legislative and administrative rules that could not have been 
anticipated at the time the patent was issued, the patentees lose 
that which makes their patents actually valuable.29 As we 
                                                                                                     
 22. See Barry C. Harris et al., Activating Actavis: A More Complete Story, 
28 ANTITRUST 83, 88 n.25 (2014) (noting how brand name drug companies have 
an incentive to settle with generic drug companies instead of litigating patents). 
Cf. Maureen A. O’Rourke & Joseph F. Brodley, An Incentives Approach to Patent 
Settlements: A Commentary on Hovenkamp, Janis and Lemley, 87 MINN. L. REV. 
1767, 1779 (2003) (discussing the option of awarding attorney’s fees to attorneys 
who bring successful patent claims). 
 23. See Hovenkamp, Janis & Lemley, supra note 21, at 1761 (remarking 
that a patent is only the right to “try” to exclude, often with low odds of success).  
 24. See Harold See & Frank M. Caprio, The Trouble with Brulotte: The 
Patent Royalty Term and Patent Monopoly Extension, 1990 UTAH L. REV. 813, 
842–43 (1990) (discussing cases where low valuations of patents were made). 
 25. See id. at 843 (“The monopoly power of a patent, and therefore its 
value, is not absolute.”). 
 26. See Benjamin K. Guthrie, Beyond Investment Protection: An 
Examination of the Potential Influence of Investment Treaties on Domestic Rule 
of Law, 45 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 1151, 1185 (2013) (noting that “prospective 
rules [allow] persons [to] plan their behavior”). 
 27. Cf. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 124, 
127 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (discussing the pros and cons of patent 
protection). 
 28. See Guthrie, supra note 26, at 1185 (noting that “prospective rules 
[allow] persons [to] plan their behavior”). 
 29. See generally Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal 
Transitions, 99 HARV. L. REV. 511, 516 (1986) (“[I]nvestment decisions must be 
based—at least implicitly—on some assumptions concerning what [legal] rules 
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demonstrate in this Article, these retroactive changes present a 
serious constitutional problem.  
Part II describes the history of patent reform leading up to 
and including the AIA. Part III explains how patent claim 
construction proceeded in the court system before the PTO. In 
Part IV, we discuss the history of takings jurisprudence from the 
early days to recent Supreme Court pronouncements on the 
subject. Part V applies that doctrine to the context of 
post-issuance review of patents granted before enactment of the 
AIA and shows that these types of patents have suffered an 
unconstitutional taking without just compensation. Part VI 
concludes. 
II. The History of Patent Reform 
A. The Creation of a “Claim” 
The American patent system boasts a long history. The first 
Patent Act was passed by the very first Congress, a mere year 
after the Constitution was ratified.30 Though the patent system 
has undergone many changes over the last two plus centuries, the 
first Patent Act had a number of provisions that are similar to 
the current statute.  
When it was initially created, the system involved 
rudimentary examination of an application for a patent.31 The 
first Patent Act also created a progenitor of the modern 
reexamination process.32 Under the provisions of the 1790 Act, 
                                                                                                     
and policies will be. To the extent that future government action departs from 
these expectations, the value of investments will be affected.”).  
 30. Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109 (1790) (repealed 1793). 
 31. See Andrew P. Morriss & Craig Allen Nard, Institutional Choice & 
Interest Groups in the Development of American Patent Law: 1790–1865, 19 SUP. 
CT. ECON. REV. 143, 150–51 (2011) (discussing the early examination system); 
Edward C. Walterscheid, Novelty & the Hotchkiss Standard, 20 FED. CIR. B.J. 
219, 228 (2010) (describing the process for receiving a patent under the 1790 
Act, including the “substantial and important” standard). 
 32. See Walterscheid, supra note 31, at 230–32 (explaining how the boards 
established by the 1790 Act led to an early version of the reexamination process 
as the boards tried to determine whether to grant patents or not). 
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within one year of a patent’s issuance, any person could file a suit 
in a district court seeking cancellation of a patent.33 Provided 
that a sufficient initial showing was made, the burden would shift 
to the patentee to prove that the patent was properly issued.34 
Failure to do so resulted in cancellation of the patent.35 Thus, in 
some sense, for the first year post-issuance, the patent was 
provisional.  
The 1790 Act was relatively short-lived. Given that it 
required three out of five Cabinet officials to spend their time 
examining patents rather than attending to their other, more 
direct duties, it is unsurprising that pressure was soon brought to 
bear to switch to a different system.36 Congress readily obliged, 
but in doing so, it abolished patent examination altogether.37 
Instead, under the new system, the applicant simply swore an 
oath that he was a true inventor of whatever he described in his 
application and paid a fee to have the patent issued.38 The 1793 
Act also expanded the cancellation practice by extending the time 
to seek such cancellation from one year to three years.39 The Act 
also did away with the presumption of validity.40 Nonetheless, 
the patentees who obtained their rights under the earlier regime 
kept them even in the face of that Act’s repeal.41  
As could be surmised, patents granted without any 
substantive examination were quite often of rather dubious 
                                                                                                     
 33. Patent Act of 1790, § 5. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. See Morriss & Nard, supra note 31, at 150–51 (noting that the 
Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson was particularly opposed to the act). 
 37. See id. (explaining how the 1793 Act shifted the gatekeeper and 
examination role in patent applications to the courts). See generally Patent Act 
of 1793, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 318 (1793) (repealed 1836). 
 38. Patent Act of 1793, §§ 1, 11. 
 39. Id. § 10. 
 40. Compare Patent Act of 1790, § 6 (making issued patents prima facie 
evidence of the exclusive rights by the patentee), with Patent Act of 1793, § 6 
(lacking a similar provision). See also 6 MOY’S WALKER ON PATENTS § 17:11 (4th 
ed. 2015). 
 41. See Patent Act of 1794, 1 Stat. 393 (1794) (allowing cases that courts 
had dismissed when the 1793 Act was repealed to be brought back into court for 
at least one year). 
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validity.42 Additionally, the system was ripe for abuse by 
unscrupulous claimants. Things got so bad that in 1809, William 
Thornton, who then served as Superintendent of Patents, wrote 
that “many of the patents are useless, except to give work to the 
lawyers, & others so useless in construction as to be . . . merely 
intended for sale.”43 A few years later, he went so far as to declare 
that a patent issued under his own authority was a fraud on the 
public.44 The Legislative and Judicial Branches were of the same 
view, with a Senate committee concluding that “[a] considerable 
portion of all the patents granted are worthless and void,”45 while 
a federal judge complained that “[t]he most frivolous and useless 
alterations in articles in common use are denominated 
improvements, and made pretexts for increasing their prices, 
while all complaint and remonstrance are effectually resisted by 
an exhibition of the great seal.”46  
Faced with this torrent of criticism,47 Congress decided to 
abandon the registration system of patents and require the 
applicant to prove an entitlement to a patent before such would 
issue to him.48 To that end, Congress enacted the Patent Act of 
1836, which returned the country to the system of pre-issuance 
patent examination.49 The 1836 Act formally established the 
                                                                                                     
 42. See Moriss & Nard, supra note 31, at 150 (noting that the Act lasted 
only from 1790 to 1793). 
 43. Edward C. Walterscheid, Patents and Manufacturing in the Early 
Republic, 80 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 855, 888 (1998) (quoting Letter 
from William Thornton to Amos Eaton (May 5, 1809)). 
 44. See Edward C. Walterscheid, The Winged Gudgeon—an Early Patent 
Controversy, 79 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 533, 533 (1997) (describing how 
Thornton was sued for libel because he said that a patent he had issued was 
fraudulent). 
 45. SENATE REPORT ACCOMPANYING BILL NO. 239, 24TH CONG., 1ST SESS. 
(Apr. 28, 1836), http://ipmall.info/hosted_resources/lipa/patents/Senate_Report_ 
for_Bill_No_293.pdf. 
 46. Thompson v. Haight, 23 F. Cas. 1040, 1041 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1826). 
 47. See generally John F. Duffy, The FCC and the Patent System: 
Progressive Ideals, Jacksonian Realism, and the Technology of Regulation, 71 U. 
COLO. L. REV. 1071, 1126–29 (2000) (highlighting general dissatisfaction with 
the pre-1836 patent system and calls for reform). 
 48. Walterscheid, supra note 43, at 888 (offering the example of a 
blacksmith who capitalized on this confusion). 
 49. Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, § 7, 5 Stat. 117, 119 (repealed 1870). 
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Patent Office50 and required an examination51 to ensure that 
what the applicant claimed  
had [not] been invented or discovered by any other person in 
this country prior to the alleged invention or discovery thereof 
by the applicant, or that it had [not] been patented or 
described in any printed publication in this or any foreign 
country, or had [not] been in public use or on sale.52  
If these conditions were not met, no patent would issue.53 
The applicant, however, could amend his application by “altering 
his specification to embrace only that part of the invention or 
discovery which is new.”54 Thus, the applicant engaged in a 
“negotiation” with the Patent Office over the proper scope, if any, 
of his exclusive rights. 
To permit the Patent Office to conduct a rigorous 
examination of patent applications, Congress needed to give the 
Office something specific it could examine. Thus, the formal 
requirement of the patent claim arose. Although it is true that it 
became more common to add a “statement of claim” to patent 
applications as the nineteenth century progressed,55 the 1836 Act 
for the first time required that the patent applicant “particularly 
specify and point out the part, improvement, or combination, 
which he claims as his own invention or discovery.”56 It is by this 
claim that the applicant’s entitlement to and the eventual scope 
of exclusive rights would be measured.57 The claiming method, 
                                                                                                     
 50. Id. § 1.  
 51. Id. § 2. 
 52. Id. § 7. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. The applicant was also permitted to persist in his application 
without any amendments, in which case his claim would be heard by an 
independent board composed of persons knowledgeable in the relevant art. Id. 
This procedure is very similar to the present-day appeals of examiners’ 
rejections to the PTAB. 
 55. See Joshua D. Sarnoff, The Historic and Modern Doctrines of 
Equivalents and Claiming the Future, Part 1 (1790–1870), 87 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 
371, 384 (2005) (describing how applicants began inserting boilerplate language 
in patents to narrow the patent’s scope and avoid intruding on other patents). 
 56. Patent Act of 1836, 5 Stat. 117 § 6 (1836). 
 57. See Cont’l Paper Bag Co. v. E. Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 419 (1908) 
(“The invention, of course, must be described and the mode of putting it to 
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however, left much to be desired. Though claims were present in 
every patent application, they were often nothing more than “a 
catalog of selected elements without explanation of how they 
interacted, merely followed by words such as ‘constructed and 
adapted to operate substantially as set forth.’”58 Needless to say, 
this sort of claim did not help the courts fix the boundaries of the 
exclusive rights claimed by the patentees.59 
The problem stemmed from the way that inventors wrote 
their claims. The claims were written in what is now known as 
“central claiming” form where the applicant “describe[s] or 
point[s] to representative embodiments of the inventive idea.”60 
The claim would then encompass a variety of the “satellite” 
creations of that idea.61 Under the 1836 Act, patent practice 
centered on the “drafting of a narrow claim setting forth a typical 
embodiment coupled with broad interpretation by the courts to 
include all equivalent constructions.”62 While affording some 
flexibility, this approach presented an obvious problem. The scope 
of the patent grant was necessarily uncertain because no one 
really knew how far from the “heart of the invention” one must be 
to avoid liability for infringement—or, for that matter, what the 
“heart of the invention” really was.63 
                                                                                                     
practical use, but the claims measure the invention. They may be explained and 
illustrated by the description. They cannot be enlarged by it.”). 
 58. Jeanne C. Fromer, Claiming Intellectual Property, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 
719, 732–33 (2009) (quoting Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 
62 F.3d 1512, 1564 n.14 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (Plager, J., dissenting)).  
 59. See id. at 732–34 (describing how the limits of patents were difficult to 
discern for anyone because of the lack of examination). 
 60. John M. Golden, Construing Patent Claims According to Their 
“Interpretive Community”: A Call for an Attorney-Plus-Artisan Perspective, 21 
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 321, 348–49 (2008). 
 61. See generally Winans v. Denmead, 56 U.S. 330 (1853) (upholding an 
infringement claim even though the accused product did not fall within the 
literal scope of the patent); Fromer, supra note 58, at 733 (discussing how the 
courts dealt with central claiming). 
 62. Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1565 
(Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc) (Nies, J., dissenting), rev’d in part on other grounds, 
520 U.S. 17 (1997). 
 63. See Emily Michiko Morris, Res or Rules? Patents and the (Uncertain) 
Rules of the Game, 18 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 481, 533 (2012) 
(“Applying rules as if they were optimal manages to be both under- and over-
inclusive.”); Fromer, supra note 58, at 769 (noting the uncertainty attendant to 
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These shortcomings ultimately led Congress to enact the 
Patent Act of 1870.64 This law was in many ways similar to the 
1836 Act but contained one major change when it came to patent 
claims. The scope of the change is particularly noteworthy given 
that the difference in language was quite subtle. Whereas the 
1836 Act required the applicant to “particularly specify and point 
out the part, improvement, or combination, which he claims as his 
own invention or discovery,”65 the 1870 Act forced the applicant 
to “particularly point out and distinctly claim the part, 
improvement, or combination which he claims as his invention.”66 
This seemingly minor change had a profound impact on the 
development of patent law.67 From that point on, the applicant’s 
exclusive rights would be delimited by the claim language.68 The 
claims would also serve the notice function by advising the public 
where the applicant’s rights end and the public rights begin.69 
This system, in contrast to the one that existed under the 1836 
Act, is known as “peripheral claiming.”70 Whereas in the central 
claiming system the patentee claims the “heart of the invention” 
and then potentially sweeps within the orbit of exclusive rights 
similar products,71 in the peripheral claiming system the 
applicant  
                                                                                                     
central claiming).  
 64. Patent Act of 1870, ch. 230, 16 Stat. 198 (1871) (repealed 1952). 
 65. Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, 5 Stat. 117 § 6 (1836) (emphasis added). 
 66. Patent Act of 1870, § 26. 
 67. Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1566 (Nies, J., dissenting) (“The amendment of 
the patent statute by the Act of 1870, while a small language change, was 
interpreted to effect a major change from central to peripheral claiming.”). 
 68. See Merrill v. Yeomans, 94 U.S. 568, 570 (1876) (“This distinct and 
formal claim is, therefore, of primary importance, in the effort to ascertain 
precisely what it is that is patented . . . to the appellant in this case.”). But see 
Golden, supra note 60, at 351–52 (arguing that the evolution of claims’ 
importance has been a slow, decades-long process, rather than a discrete event 
occasioned by the 1870 Act).  
 69. See Craig Allen Nard, Legal Forms and the Common Law of Patents, 90 
B.U. L. REV. 51, 67 n.67 (2010) (explaining how the term “claim” was brought to 
prominence in patent challenges).  
 70. See JANICE M. MUELLER, AN INTRODUCTION TO PATENT LAW 54 (2d ed. 
2006) (“Peripheral claiming means that the claim recites a precise boundary or 
periphery of the patentee’s property right . . . .”). 
 71. See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts? 
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stakes out the boundaries within which the patentee holds his 
monopoly. The general description of the invention which 
makes up the bulk of the patent is thus considerably less 
important in the context of patent infringement. In the 
peripheral claiming system it is therefore possible for a 
product to be virtually identical to an invention described in a 
patent, yet the claimed invention is not infringed.72 
In creating this new system, Congress hoped both to equip the 
Patent Office with tools to separate meritorious applications from 
the undeserving ones and “to improve the quality of the patents 
by circumscribing the patentee’s ability to enforce overly vague 
patents against the unsuspecting public.”73 
B. The Evolving (Re)Examination System 
Once the PTO became charged with evaluating patent 
applications prior to granting, it had to create a method to 
separate applications directed to legitimate inventions from those 
that were concerned with frivolous or non-novel things.74 Given 
the importance of this step to obtaining patents, much of the 
reform efforts over the past century and a half have focused on 
the patent application examination procedures.75 
On one hand, an inventor must write his claims in such a 
way as to “particularly [point] out and distinctly [claim] the 
                                                                                                     
Rethinking Patent Claim Construction?, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1743, 1746 (2009) 
(explaining how the 1870 Patent Acts encouraged a central claiming approach). 
 72. Werner Stemer, The Doctrine of Equivalents After Hilton Davis and 
Markman, and a Proposal for Further Clarification, 22 NOVA L. REV. 783, 789 
(1998). 
 73. Dolin, Dubious Patent Reform, supra note 3, at 889. 
 74. See Joseph Scott Miller, Substance, Procedure, and the Divided Patent 
Power, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 31, 42 (2011) (discussing the origination of centralized 
regulatory patent challenges). 
 75. See Dolin, Dubious Patent Reform, supra note 3, at 886–95 (giving an 
overview of post-grant procedures); Stephen Yelderman, Improving Patent 
Quality with Applicant Incentives, 28 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 77, 78 (2014) 
(“Whatever the means, these reforms share a common and urgent goal: making 
the examination process more effective at identifying and rejecting low-quality 
patent applications.”). 
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subject matter [that he] regards as his invention.”76 On the other 
hand, as Judge Richard Linn of the Federal Circuit observed,  
[A] claim is a linguistic description of a mental concept. Due to 
the inherent limitations of language, the fit between the 
description and the concept is almost always inexact. In 
addition to the inexact fit caused by the inherent limitations of 
language, the language itself may not be adequately developed 
at the early stages when patent applications typically are filed, 
particularly in rapidly evolving research fields.77 
The efforts to improve the PTO evaluation of the claim language 
have been mostly of two varieties. One focused on the personnel 
and another on the process of quality control.78 Over the years, 
the PTO has grown in both the number and the sophistication of 
people it employs (perhaps little differently from any other 
government agency).79 While the personnel reforms attempted to 
address problems through the “all hands on deck” approach,80 the 
procedural reforms—and proposed reforms—focused on the 
ability of the PTO to catch its own mistakes via a “second look” at 
patents or patent applications.81 
As early as 1918, an observer of a patent system argued that 
the then-existing patent system resulted in patents being granted 
for things “not invented,” “not new,” and “not useful,” all causing 
“unsettled, unsafe and unsound business conditions.”82 To 
                                                                                                     
 76. 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) (2012). 
 77. Festo v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558, 621–22 
(Fed. Cir. 2000) (Linn, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part); see also French 
v. Rogers, 9 F. Cas. 790, 792 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1851) (noting that “as inventors are 
rarely experts either in philology or law, it has long been established as a rule, 
that their writings are to be scanned with a good degree of charity”). 
 78. See R. Polk Wagner, Understanding Patent-Quality Mechanisms, 157 
U. PA. L. REV. 2135, 2158–62 (2009) (listing the administrative changes aimed at 
achieving these goals). 
 79. See John M. Golden, Proliferating Patents and Patent Law’s “Cost 
Disease,” 51 HOUS. L. REV. 455, 486–87 (2013) (explaining how the PTO tries to 
use an increase in personnel to solve patent problems). 
 80. See id. (detailing the exponential increase in the number of patent 
employees, growing “nearly one-hundred fold” from 1836 to 2012). 
 81. See generally Dolin, Dubious Patent Reform, supra note 3, at 886–923; 
Wagner, supra note 78, at 2158–62. 
 82. James H. Lightfoot, A Proposed Department of Invention and Discovery, 
1 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 116, 118–19 (1918). 
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address this problem, he proposed creating a “Bureau of Validity 
Examinations” that would be staffed with “re-examiners to re-
examine claims held allowable by other assistant examiners.”83 In 
his view, this additional procedure would “afford inventors full 
protection and be essentially valid, thus constituting a safe and 
sound basis for the establishment of industries and safe and 
secure investments for the capitalists who may promote the 
establishment thereof.”84 This early “second look” proposal 
focused on early stage re-examination (perhaps even pre-formal 
patent issuance),85 so that an issued patent would “provide for 
the grant of unconditional, secure and exclusive rights.”86 Though 
not heeded, the idea did not entirely disappear, either. In 1943, 
this thought reappeared in a Report of the National Patent 
Planning Commission, which suggested an administrative claim 
revocation procedure in lieu of litigation.87 The recommendation, 
however, suggested that these procedures be limited to the first 
six months of patent life—and was altogether silent on whether 
to apply the proposed procedure to patents that have already 
issued.88  
The drumbeat of complaints about “poor quality” patents 
that make it through the porous sieve of the PTO continued even 
after Congress enacted the far-reaching reforms in the 1952 
Patent Act.89 Although for the first time the Act clearly 
delineated the separate requirements for patentability90 and 
instituted a number of other improvements to the system,91 
                                                                                                     
 83. Id. at 127. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. (proposing that the Bureau “[re-]examine the subject-matter of each 
application . . . so that when granted patents may afford inventors full 
protection. . . .” (emphasis added)). 
 86. Id. at 118 (emphasis added). 
 87. Report of the Nat’l Patent Planning Comm., 78th Cong. (1943), 25 J. 
PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 455, 460 (1943). 
 88. See id. at 460–61 (noting the difficulty of evaluating all the facts when 
determining whether to grant a patent). 
 89. See Dolin, Dubious Patent Reform, supra note 3, at 891–93 (detailing 
some of the complaints regarding the 1952 Patent Acts reforms). 
 90. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–103, 112 (2012) (listing the statutory 
requirements for sufficient evidence). 
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within about a dozen years, complaints of lax PTO procedures 
and multitudes of erroneously issued patents reared their head 
again.92  
Following the recommendations of the Presidential 
Commission on the Patent System,93 Congress made several 
attempts to create procedures that would address the “lax” 
standards of the Patent Office that supposedly resulted in “low 
quality” patents,94 but the first reexamination procedure was not 
enacted until 1980.95 Under most of these proposals, patents 
would be subject to reconsideration at the PTO, but just for a 
limited time, and after the expiration of that period could only be 
attacked in court.96 The proposals were also consistent with the 
European practice of patent opposition, as was noted by Judge 
Giles S. Rich, one of the key authors of the Patent Act of 1952 and 
a preeminent authority on patent law: “Oppositions shortly after 
patent rights come into being (between five months and one year 
in the British ‘belated opposition’) are favored.”97 Indeed, Edward 
F. McKie, Jr., a premier patent litigator who went on to argue—
and win—the landmark case of Diamond v. Chakrabarty,98 
explicitly cautioned against patent reexaminations unrestricted 
                                                                                                     
 91. See L. James Harris, Some Aspects of the Underlying Legislative Intent 
of the Patent Act of 1952, 23 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 658, 659–60 (1955) (“They 
boldly planned and carried out comprehensive programs of study and discussion 
of the patent statutes . . . .”). 
 92. See Dolin, Dubious Patent Reform, supra note 3, at 891–93 (detailing 
some of the complaints regarding the 1952 Patent Act reforms). 
 93. REP. OF THE PRES. COMM’N ON THE PATENT SYS., S. DOC. NO. 90-5 (1st 
Sess. 1967). 
 94. See generally H.R. 14632, 94th Cong. (1976); S. 473, 94th Cong. (1975); 
S. 2930, 93d Cong. (1974); S. 1321, 93d Cong. (1974); S. 4259, 93d Cong. (1974); 
S. 4259, 93d Cong. (1974); S. 2930, 93d Cong. (1974); S. 2504, 93d Cong. (1973); 
S. 1321, 93d Cong. (1973); S. 643, 92d Cong. (1971); S. 1569, 91st Cong. (1969); 
S. 1246, 91st Cong. (1969); H.R. 12880, 91st Cong. (1969); S. 1042, 90th Cong. 
(1967); S. 1691, 90th Cong. (1967); S. 2597, 90th Cong. (1967); H.R. 5924, 90th 
Cong. (1967). 
 95. Bayh-Dole Act, Pub. L. No. 96-517, ch. 30, 94 Stat. 3015 (1980). 
 96. See Dolin, Dubious Patent Reform, supra note 3, at 893–94 (explaining 
this process for challenging patents). 
 97. Giles S. Rich, Forward—and Comments on Post-Issuance 
Reexamination, 4 AM. PAT. L. ASS’N Q.J. 86, 87–88 (1976). 
 98. 447 U.S. 303 (1980). 
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by time but endorsed a proposal that would have allowed public 
opposition and reexamination proceedings within a year of a 
patent’s allowance.99 
Yet, despite these warnings, the reexamination procedure 
created as part of the Bayh–Dole Act was significantly more 
far-reaching than the early proposals. First, it was made to apply 
to all patents whether issued before or after the effective day of 
the Act.100 Second, there were no time limits to requesting the 
reexamination.101 Nonetheless, the reexamination procedure was 
limited only to questions of novelty and obviousness.102 Other 
questions of invalidity such as lack of enablement, failure of 
written description, inequitable conduct, etc., were beyond the 
scope of the procedure.103 
The reexamination procedure established by the Bayh–Dole 
Act starts when any party—including the patentee himself—files 
a petition with the PTO that argues, by citing to prior art, that 
the patent fails to clear either the novelty bar of § 102 or the 
obviousness bar of § 103—or both.104 If the PTO is convinced that 
there exists a “substantial new question of patentability,” a 
reexamination shall be ordered.105 Once ordered, the 
reexamination proceeds just like the original examination of a 
patent application would, with only the applicant and the Patent 
Office involved.106 The requester—unless it is the patentee 
                                                                                                     
 99. Edward F. McKie, Jr., Proposals for an American Patent Opposition 
System in the Light of the History of Foreign Systems, 56 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 94, 
101 (1974). 
 100. See Patlex Corp. v. Mossinghoff, 758 F.2d 594, 602 (Fed. Cir. 1985), 
amended by, 771 F.2d 480 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (“Congress, without apparent 
objection, applied the legislation to all unexpired patents.”).  
 101. Pub. L. No. 96-517, § 302, 94 Stat. 3015, 3015 (1980) (codified at 35 
U.S.C. § 302 (2012)) (“Any person at any time may file a request for 
reexamination by the Office of any claim of a patent on the basis of any prior art 
cited . . . .”) (emphasis added). 
 102. 35 U.S.C. § 302 (2012). 
 103. See Gregory Dolin, Reverse Settlements As Patent Invalidity Signals, 24 
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 281, 327 (2011) (noting that at trial a patent could be 
attacked on all of these grounds); see also 37 C.F.R. § 1.906(c) (excluding these 
types of claims from an administrative adjudication).  
 104. 35 U.S.C. §§ 301–302. 
 105. Id. § 304. 
 106. Id. § 305 (“[R]eexamination will be conducted according to the 
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himself—is not a party to these further proceedings—hence the 
name ex parte reexamination.107 In these proceedings, the PTO 
considers the claims subject to review as if these claims were 
never granted in the first place.108 The applicant, in turn, can also 
take advantage of this posture and seek amendment of his claims 
to avoid any finding of invalidity.109 Ex parte reexamination was 
promoted as a means for “efficient resolution of questions about 
the validity of issued patents without recourse to expensive and 
lengthy infringement litigation.”110  
These confident predictions quickly gave rise to 
disappointment and complaints that the reexamination system is 
not living up to its goals of “clearing the field” of invalid 
patents.111 One of the causes of this failure was believed to be the 
inability of the initial reexamination requesters to argue their 
case to the PTO.112  
In 1990, then-Secretary of Commerce Robert Mosbacher 
created an Advisory Commission on Patent Reform that in 1992 
produced a comprehensive report recommending a number of 
changes in the patent system.113 One of the recommendations was 
“providing third parties with more opportunities for substantive 
                                                                                                     
procedures established for initial examination.”). 
 107. 37 C.F.R. § 1.550(g) (2014).  
 108. 35 U.S.C. § 305; 37 C.F.R. § 1.550. 
 109. See In re Yamamoto, 740 F.2d 1569, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (discussing 
how a claimant can make adjustments to claims if necessary in a PTO 
proceeding, but cannot do so in the district court proceeding); Rules of Practice 
in Patent Cases, 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.111, 1.550 (2014) (detailing the process for 
making adjustments to claims in a PTO proceeding).  
 110. H.R. REP. NO. 96-1307, pt. 1, at 3–4 (1980). 
 111. See, e.g., Kenneth R. Adamo, Reexamination—To What Avail? An 
Overview, 63 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 616 (1981) (recommending changes in 
reexamination procedure); Lawrence A. Stahl & Donald H. Heckenberg, Jr., The 
Changing Attitudes Toward Inter Partes Reexamination 1 (June 9, 2010), 
http://www.fitzpatrickcella.com/DB6EDC/assets/files/News/attachment622.pdf 
(expressing frustration with inter partes patent resolution).  
 112. See Stahl & Heckenberg, supra note 111, at 1 (explaining why parties 
avoid ex parte reexaminations). 
 113. See generally ADVISORY COMM. ON PATENT LAW REFORM, A REPORT TO 
THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE (Aug. 1992), http://ipmall.info/hosted_ 
resources/lipa/patents/patentact/ACPLR-l.pdf.  
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participation during the reexamination proceedings.”114 It took 
another few years, but eventually Congress responded to the 
perceived problems of ex parte reexamination and in 1999 created 
an additional reexamination process that allowed for the 
participation of the third party in the process.115 If ordered, the 
inter partes reexamination, much like ex parte reexamination, 
was conducted according to the same procedures as the initial 
examination, except with the opportunity for the requester to file 
responses to any filings by the patentee.116 Unlike ex parte 
reexamination, however, the inter partes process was only 
applicable to patents that were applied for on or after the 
effective date of the act creating the procedure.117 Thus, any pre-
existing patents did not face the prospect of this quasi-litigation 
at the PTO.118 
Inter partes reexamination was met with even less success 
than its ex parte cousin.119 Indeed, some attorneys have gone so 
far as to say that “it would be legal malpractice to recommend a 
client initiate an inter partes reexamination.”120 Because of this 
perceived failure in the process, Congress began to yet again look 
for ways to improve the quality of patents by giving the Patent 
Office additional tools to weed out patents that should not have 
been issued. That led to the eventual passage of the America 
Invents Act and a host of new “second look” proceedings.  
                                                                                                     
 114. Id. at 14. 
 115. American Inventors Protection Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-113, 113 
Stat. 1501 (codified in relevant part in 35 U.S.C. §§ 311–318 (2006)) (repealed 
2012). 
 116. 35 U.S.C. § 314 (2012); 37 C.F.R. § 1.937 (2014). We use the past tense 
because the Leahy–Smith America Invents Act abolished inter partes 
reexamination. See Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 6, 125 Stat. 284, 299–313 (2011). 
 117. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.913 (2014) (implementing Pub. L. No. 106-113, § 4608 
(1999)). 
 118. Id. 
 119. See Gaia Bernstein, The Rise of the End User in Patent Litigation, 55 
B.C. L. REV. 1443, 1472 (2014) (noting how the PTO procedures, while less 
expensive, are not a good alternative for litigation). 
 120. Sherry M. Knowles, Thomas E. Vanderbloemen & Charles E. Peeler, 
Inter Partes Patent Reexamination in the United States, 86 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK 
OFF. SOC’Y 611, 614 (2004) (quoting 147 Cong. Rec. H5360 (Sept. 5, 2001) 
(remarks of Rep. Berman)). 
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C. The Post-Issuance Proceedings Under the America Invents Act 
The AIA was Congress’s latest—though apparently not 
last121—attempt to “fix” the patent system by reducing the 
number of “low-quality” patents in circulation. To do that, 
Congress created several new mechanisms for post-issuance 
review. In creating these new mechanisms, Congress attempted 
to fix the shortcomings of the old reexamination systems.122 The 
procedures that emerged were therefore, unsurprisingly, quite 
different from what came before. The AIA created three distinct 
post-issuance review proceedings, each with its own unique 
applicability.123 The three new mechanisms created by the AIA 
are (1) Post Grant Review;124 (2) Inter Partes Review;125 and 
(3) Covered Business Method Review.126 This Article will discuss 
each of the procedures in turn, though it will focus mostly on the 
latter two for reasons that will become obvious shortly. 
                                                                                                     
 121. See, e.g., Innovation Act, H.R. 9, 114th Cong. (1st Sess. 2015); 
Protecting American Talent and Entrepreneurship (PATENT) Act, S. 1137, 
114th Cong. (1st Sess. 2015); Innovation Protection Act, H.R. 1832, 114th Cong. 
(1st Sess. 2015); Demand Letter Transparency Act, H.R. 1896, 114th Cong. (1st 
Sess. 2015); Targeting Rogue and Opaque Letters (TROL) Act, H.R. 2045, 114th 
Cong. (1st Sess. 2015); Support Technology and Research for Our Nation’s 
Growth (STRONG) Patents Act, S. 632, 114th Cong. (1st Sess. 2015); Innovation 
Act, H.R. 3309, 113th Cong. (1st Sess. 2013); Patent Transparency and 
Improvements Act, S. 1720, 113th Cong. (1st Sess. 2013); Patent Litigation 
Integrity Act, S. 1612, 113th Cong. (1st Sess. 2013); STOP Act, H.R. 2766, 113th 
Cong. (1st Sess. 2013); Patent Litigation and Innovation Act, H.R. 2639, 113th 
Cong. (1st Sess. 2013); Patent Abuse Reduction Act, S. 1013, 113th Cong. (1st 
Sess. 2013); End Anonymous Patents Act, H.R. 2024, 113th Cong. (1st Sess. 
2013); Patent Quality Improvement Act, S. 866, 113th Cong. (1st Sess. 2013); 
SHIELD Act, H.R. 845, 113th Cong. (1st Sess. 2013). 
 122. See Dolin, Dubious Patent Reform, supra note 3, at 913 (describing how 
Congress continues to create ineffective post-issuance review mechanisms). 
 123. For a detailed discussion of the mechanics of these proceedings see id. 
at 914–23. 
 124. 35 U.S.C. §§ 321–329 (2012). 
 125. Id. §§ 311–319. 
 126. Leahy–Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 18, 125 Stat. 
284, 329–31 (2011). 
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1. Post-Grant Review 
The Post-Grant Review (PGR) process actually resembles the 
original, mid-twentieth century proposals for reexamination.127 It 
is also similar to the opposition practice in the European Patent 
Office,128 and indeed was enacted with an eye towards making 
the U.S. patent issuance process similar to the European one.129 
PGR, however, is not of particular relevance to the focus of this 
Article because Congress was quite careful in crafting this 
provision. Much like the now-defunct inter partes reexamination, 
PGR was made applicable only to applications filed after the 
effective date of the Act.130 Although it is not clear that PGRs will 
actually improve the patent system,131 this mechanism creates no 
problem similar to the one presented by the other two AIA-
created post-issuance proceedings.132 Because PGR is applicable 
only to patents issued after the effective date of the Act, future 
inventors could take PGR into account when drafting their 
applications, but past inventors were not similarly blessed when 
it comes to the remaining mechanisms. 
2. Inter Partes Review and Covered Business Method Review 
Inter Partes Review (IPR) supplanted the abolished inter 
partes reexamination,133 though it kept some of its features. Any 
                                                                                                     
 127. See supra notes 89–99 and accompanying text (discussing how the 
reexamination process was created and how it changed over time). 
 128. See generally Opposition Procedure in the EPO, OFFICIAL J. EPO 148 
(Mar. 2001), http://archive.epo.org/epo/pubs/oj001/03_01/03_ 1481.pdf. 
 129. See Filip De Corte et al., AIA Post-Grant Review & European 
Oppositions: Will They Work in Tandem, or Rather Pass Like Ships in the 
Night?, 14 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 93, 96 (2012) (describing the third-party options 
available for cancellation). 
 130. See Leahy–Smith America Invents Act, § 134(m)(A), 125 Stat. at 330 
(explaining that the goal of the act was to harmonize the U.S. patent system 
with those of entities such as the European Union, Japan, Canada, and 
Australia). 
 131. See generally Dolin, Dubious Patent Reform, supra note 3. 
 132. See infra Parts III.C–D and Part V (noting how post-issuance 
proceedings can lead to issues with the Takings Clause). 
 133. See Abbott Labs. v. Cordis Corp., 710 F.3d 1318, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2013) 
 
TAKING PATENTS 741 
person other than a patent owner can file an IPR request 
challenging an issued patent on the grounds that it is not novel or 
is obvious in light of prior art.134 The challenger must identify the 
patent claims he believes to be improperly issued and submit 
documents that would support his allegations.135 If the PTO 
grants the petition and institutes the IPR proceedings,136 the 
matter goes to trial before the Patent Trials and Appeals Board 
(PTAB), which then renders the final decision on the validity of 
the claims.137 
Covered Business Method Review (CBMR) is in many ways 
similar to IPR but has, on the one hand, additional limitations on 
which patents are eligible for such review, while on the other 
hand it gives challengers more potential grounds for invalidation 
of CBMR-eligible patents.138 Under the AIA, patents are subject 
to CBMR only if they “claim[] a method or corresponding 
apparatus for performing data processing or other operations 
used in the practice, administration, or management of a 
financial product or service, except that the term does not include 
patents for technological inventions.”139  
The trial phase of IPR and CBMR is in some ways similar to 
a traditional trial in the courts of record, though perhaps a bit 
more abbreviated and streamlined.140 For example, discovery in 
the form of expert reports, cross-examination of expert witnesses, 
productions of documents or things inconsistent with a party’s 
                                                                                                     
(quoting H.R.Rep. No. 112–98, pt. 1, at 46–47 (2011)). 
 134. 35 U.S.C. § 311(a) (2012).  
 135. Id. § 312(a)(3). 
 136. Id. § 314.  
 137. Id. §§ 316(c), 318. 
 138. See Leahy–Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 18(a)(1), 
125 Stat. 284, 330 (2011) (requiring that CBMR be conducted under the same 
rules as PGR); 35 U.S.C. § 321(b) (establishing broad grounds for PGR review). 
In contrast, IPR is only available for petitions challenging a patent’s novelty or 
non-obviousness. Id. § 311(b). 
 139. Leahy–Smith America Invents Act § 18(d)(1), 125 Stat. at 331. One 
final difference between IPR and CBMR is that the latter is a “transitional” 
program and will expire eight years after first becoming available on September 
16, 2020. Id. § 18(a)(3), 125 Stat. at 330. 
 140. See Dolin, Dubious Patent Reform, supra note 3, at 916 (describing the 
similarities and differences between federal and PGR trials). 
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asserted position, and the like is permitted,141 though of course it 
has to be accomplished rather quickly given the twelve-month 
deadline for the PTAB to render its final judgment.142 
The key differences between a trial before the PTAB and 
before an Article III judge lie in two features unique to the PTO 
procedures. First, the patent challenger bears a lower burden of 
proof before the PTAB than he does at the district court.143 
Whereas in the district courts patents can only be invalidated 
upon the showing of “clear and convincing evidence,”144 in the 
PTO proceedings, the petitioner carries his burden by satisfying 
the “preponderance of evidence” standard.145 Second, and 
particularly salient to the focus of this paper, is the difference in 
how the Patent Office reviews the challenged claims. Whereas in 
federal court, claims are construed by reference to what a person 
having ordinary skill in the relevant art understands them to 
mean,146 at the Patent Office the claims are given their “broadest 
reasonable construction.”147 It is to the importance of this 
distinction that we now turn. 
III. Claim Construction and Meaning 
“It is a ‘bedrock principle’ of patent law that ‘the claims of a 
patent define the invention to which the patentee is entitled the 
right to exclude.’”148 This understanding stems from the 
                                                                                                     
 141. 35 U.S.C. §§ 316(a)(5), 326(a)(5) (2012).  
 142. Id. §§ 316(a)(11). 
 143. Compare id. §§ 316(e), 326(e) (“[T]he petitioner shall have the burden of 
proving a proposition of unpatentability by a preponderance of the evidence.”), 
with Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 131 S. Ct. 2238, 2242 (2011) (holding that 
under 35 U.S.C. § 282, a patent invalidity defense raised in litigation must be 
proven by “clear and convincing evidence”). See also infra Parts III.B–C. 
 144. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 131 S. Ct. at 2242. 
 145. 35 U.S.C. §§ 316(e), 326(e). 
 146. See Multiform Desiccants, Inc. v. Medzam, Ltd., 133 F.3d 1473, 1477 
(Fed. Cir. 1998) (“It is the person of ordinary skill in the field of the invention 
through whose eyes the claims are construed. Such person is deemed to read the 
words used in the patent documents . . . and to have knowledge of any special 
meaning and usage in the field.”). 
 147. 37 C.F.R. §§ 42.100(b), 42.200(b) (2014). 
 148. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) 
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requirement that the patentee “particularly point out and 
distinctly claim” his invention.149 Thus, it is “the claims that 
measure the invention,”150 or as Judge Rich put it, “the name of 
the game is the claim.”151 At the same time, as the courts have 
recognized, language is often an imperfect measure of the scope of 
the invention, and “the fit between the description and the 
concept is almost always inexact.”152 As a result, to understand 
what the inventor has claimed for herself and to delineate the 
scope of the patentee’s right to exclude, the language of the claim 
must be construed.153 Similarly, to verify that the applicant has 
actually invented something new and does not seek to exclude the 
public from that which is already known, the claim must be 
construed and then compared to the prior art.154 Because both 
infringement and validity analyses ride on the meaning of the 
claim, claim construction is often the “end all and be all” of patent 
examination and patent litigation.155 Although one would think 
                                                                                                     
(quoting Innova/Pure Water, Inc. v. Safari Water Filtration Sys., Inc., 381 F.3d 
1111, 1115 (Fed. Cir. 2004)). 
 149. See Merrill v. Yeomans, 94 U.S. 568, 570 (1876) (“The act of Congress, 
therefore, very wisely requires of the applicant a distinct and specific statement 
of what he claims . . . . This distinct and formal claim is, therefore, of primary 
importance, in the effort to ascertain precisely what it is that is patented . . . .”). 
 150. SRI Int’l v. Matsushita Elec. Corp. of Am., 775 F.2d 1107, 1121 (Fed. 
Cir. 1985) (en banc); see also Smith v. Snow, 294 U.S. 1, 11 (1935) (reiterating 
that it is the claims of the patent, and not its specifications, that measure the 
invention). 
 151. Giles Sutherland Rich, Extent of Protection and Interpretation of 
Claims—American Perspectives, 21 INT’L REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 497, 
499 (1990). 
 152. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558, 
621 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (Rader, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), 
vacated, 535 U.S. 722 (2002). 
 153. See David L. Schwartz, Pre-Markman Reversal Rates, 43 LOY. L.A. L. 
REV. 1073, 1078 (2010) (showing that claim construction is the first step one 
must take in patent infringement analysis); see also Markman v. Westview 
Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 997 n.7 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc)) (“[W]e have 
held that a claim ‘must be construed before determining its validity, just as it is 
first construed before deciding infringement.’”). 
 154. See Thomas Chen, Patent Claim Construction: An Appeal for Chevron 
Deference, 94 VA. L. REV. 1165, 1169 (2008) (discussing infringement analysis 
and validity analysis). 
 155. Id.; see also Christopher A. Cotropia, Patent Claim Interpretation and 
Information Costs, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 57, 72 (2005) (“This constructive 
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that the same words of the claim would be given the same 
construction at all stages of the process, in reality that is not the 
case. The PTO construes claims differently from the federal 
courts.156 The different treatment might make sense at the 
examination stage of the patent, but maintaining the difference 
post-issuance undermines the exclusive right secured by the 
patent and in so doing, at least in some cases presents a 
constitutional problem. 
A. Claim Construction During Patent Examination 
The goal of patent examination is to ascertain the 
“patentability of the invention as ‘the applicant regards’ it,”157 
and to measure it against the prior art. But as already stated, 
language is inherently an ambiguous medium through which to 
define almost anything, much less technical inventions.158 The 
examination then exists “to fashion claims that are precise, clear, 
correct, and unambiguous. Only in this way can uncertainties of 
claim scope be removed, as much as possible, during the 
administrative process.”159  
An uninitiated person might think that a broad claim is 
necessarily better than a narrow claim. After all, to analogize to 
real property, claims on more land are likely more valuable than 
claims on less land because one can exclude other individuals 
from a broader swath of property. But patent law is different. 
Although a broad claim does grant one an opportunity to exclude 
                                                                                                     
specification embodies the full extent of the specification’s information about the 
invention and is, accordingly, labeled the ‘disclosed invention.’”). 
 156. See supra notes 143–147 and accompanying text (showing the 
differences in evidentiary standards when proving unpatentability in trials 
before the PTAB and before Article III courts); see also infra Part III.A–C 
(discussing claim construction and meaning as bedrock principles in patent 
law). 
 157. In re Zletz, 893 F.2d 319, 322 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 112 
¶ 2 (2012)). 
 158. See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 
722, 723 (2002) (“[P]atent claim language may not describe with complete 
precision the range of an invention’s novelty.”). 
 159. Zletz, 3 F.2d at 322. 
TAKING PATENTS 745 
others from a broader area of any given technology160—and thus 
charge higher prices to anyone who wishes to practice in the 
area161—there is a corollary maxim that makes broader claims 
potentially highly problematic. Because patents can only be 
granted for inventing new and non-obvious things,162 a claim that 
describes something that pre-dated the claimed invention cannot 
be granted,163 and, if granted in error, is invalid.164 Thus, a broad 
claim may well be useful to ensnare more putative infringers,165 
but it is also a trap for the unwary. A broad claim has a higher 
chance of sweeping within its ambit things that pre-existed the 
applicant’s invention.166 Thus the rule: “That which infringes, if 
                                                                                                     
 160. See Orin S. Kerr, Computers and the Patent System: The Problem of the 
Second Step, 28 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 47, 53 (2002) (using the 
example of computerized algorithms to show how obtaining a patent on a 
machine that executes a certain function gives the inventor the right to exclude 
others from running that algorithm on a computer for the duration of the 
patent, creating broad patent protection); Jacob Mackler, Intellectual Property 
Favoritism: Who Wins in the Globalized Economy, the Patent or the Trade 
Secret?, 12 WAKE FOREST J. BUS. & INTELL. PROP. L. 263, 268–69 (2012) (“[A] 
patentee with broad patent rights can exclude from the market a broad range of 
‘functionally equivalent’ inventions.”).  
 161. See Richard S. Toikka, Patent Licensing Under Competitive and Non-
Competitive Conditions, 82 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 279, 287 (2000) 
(noting that most commentators agree that a broad patent can command a 
higher per unit royalty, which is confirmed by the inverse relationship of the 
elasticity of demand and the ability of the patent to exclude substitutes). 
 162. 35 U.S.C. §§ 102–103 (2012). 
 163. Id.; see also Clark D. Asay, Enabling Patentless Innovation, 74 MD. L. 
REV. 431, 447 (2015) (“[A] patent technically may not issue if each of the claim 
elements in a patent application is found in a single prior art reference.”). 
 164. See 35 U.S.C. § 282(b)(2) (noting that a defense to a patent 
infringement claim is that the patent was invalid in the first place); Weldon E. 
Havins, Immunizing the Medical Practitioner “Process” Infringer: Greasing the 
Squeaky Wheel, Good Public Policy, or What?, 77 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 51, 57 
(1999) (“If the patent has been issued and challenged, the court is required to 
hold the patent invalid and inadvertently granted by the PTO.”). 
 165. See Yelderman, supra note 75, at 88–89 (showing that a broader claim 
makes it more likely that an alleged infringer will be found to infringe the 
patent, and the greater the number of potential infringers, the more difficult it 
will be for those potential infringers to avoid or design around the claim). 
 166. See id. at 87–88 (remarking that broad claims make it difficult to prove 
the validity of a claim due to the fact that it is impossible to conduct a search 
exhaustive enough to conclusively prove the non-existence of potentially 
invalidating prior art). 
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later, would anticipate [and invalidate], if earlier.”167 The point of 
the examination, both for the PTO and the applicant, is to narrow 
the claims to such parameters as not to encompass prior art 
within its ambit.168  
To achieve those goals, the PTO pushes against the applicant 
to see how far his claims extend,169 much like judges push against 
litigants in oral argument to see how far the logic of a given 
proposition extends.170 In response, applicants can disclaim 
certain meanings or amend claims as they see fit.171 This process 
can continue through several rounds and last months or years as 
the applicant and the PTO fine-tune the language of the 
claims.172 These disclaimers and amendments indicate what the 
                                                                                                     
 167. Peters v. Active Mfg. Co., 129 U.S. 530, 537 (1889).  
 168. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.111(c) (2012) (“[T]he applicant or patent owner must 
clearly point out the patentable novelty which he or she thinks the claims 
present . . . .”); Kristen Osenga, Cooperative Patent Prosecution: Viewing Patents 
Through A Pragmatics Lens, 85 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 115, 136 (2011) (explaining 
that an inventor can overcome a rejection from PTO examiners either by 
amending the claim to narrow or clarify its scope, or showing how the rejected 
claim is different from prior art). 
 169. See In re Yamamoto, 740 F.2d 1569, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (“This 
approach serves the public interest by reducing the possibility that claims, 
finally allowed, will be given broader scope than is justified.”); Application of 
Prater, 415 F.2d 1393, 1404 (C.C.P.A. 1969) (“[R]eading the claim in light of the 
specification . . . .”). Cf. Chimie v. PPG Indus., Inc., 402 F.3d 1371, 1384 (Fed. 
Cir. 2005) (“The purpose of consulting the prosecution history in construing a 
claim is to ‘exclude any interpretation that was disclaimed during prosecution.’” 
(quoting ZMI Corp. v. Cardiac Resuscitator Corp., 844 F.2d 1576, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 
1988))). 
 170. See Daniel M. Friedman, Winning on Appeal, 9 LITIG. 15, 18 (1983) 
(explaining that oral argument is an “occasion that the court can question 
counsel, test his position to determine its strengths and weaknesses, and 
determine the implications and consequences of the arguments”).  
 171. See supra note 168 and accompanying text (recounting how an 
applicant can narrow or amend her claim if rejected by the PTO due to 
questionable similarities to prior art).  
 172. See Dennis Crouch & Robert P. Merges, Operating Efficiently Post-
Bilski by Ordering Patent Doctrine Decision-Making, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 
1673, 1689–90 (2010) (recounting the long and arduous patent examination 
process and the multiple rounds of examination involved, along with a lack of 
any predictable pattern or linearity); Hana Oh Chen, Combating Baseless Patent 
Suits: Rule 11 Sanctions with Technology-Specific Application, 54 JURIMETRICS 
J. 135, 178 n.36 (2014) (describing the prevalence of frivolous patent lawsuits 
and use of Rule 11 sanctions that attempt to combat frivolous suits by 
encouraging parties to perform sufficient prefiling investigation). 
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applicant regards as his invention and narrow the reach of the 
claims to avoid capturing the prior art.173 It therefore makes 
perfect sense to interpret the claims as broadly as reasonable to 
confine the applicant to that which he actually invented and to 
make sure that the claims as issued are not invalid for reading on 
prior art. Once the claims issue, however, all of the amendments, 
disclaimers, and modifications become part of the patent 
prosecution history and can be used to hold the patentee to the 
scope of the claims as he presented them to the PTO.174 At this 
point, interpreting the claims as broadly as reasonable no longer 
makes sense. 
B. Claim Construction in Litigation 
It is worth remembering that the PTO does not adjudge 
infringement disputes (which can only arise after the patent 
issues).175 The concern of the PTO is to make sure that the 
applied-for claims do not encompass or “read on” prior art.176 A 
practitioner in a relevant field, on the other hand, would want to 
know whether his product is encompassed by the already issued 
claims so as to take the necessary steps to avoid infringement.177 
                                                                                                     
 173. See Yamamoto, 740 F.2d at 1571 (“The PTO broadly interprets claims 
during examination of a patent application since the applicant may ‘amend his 
claims to obtain protection commensurate with his actual contribution to the 
act.’”); Chimie, 402 F.3d at 1384 (relaying that, when patentees unequivocally 
disavow certain meanings to obtain patents, the doctrine of prosecution 
disclaimer attaches, which narrows the ordinary meaning of the claim). 
 174. See Festo Corp. v. Shokestu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 
722, 733 (2002) (“Prosecution history estoppel requires that the claims of a 
patent be interpreted in light of the proceedings in the PTO during the 
application process.”). 
 175. See Jonathan S. Masur, Regulating Patents, 2010 SUP. CT. REV. 275, 
317 (2010) (stating that the PTO has never been delegated any authority over 
issues of infringement). 
 176. See Franklin Pierce Law Center’s Eighth Intellectual Property System 
Major Issues Conference, 47 IDEA 1, 37 (2006) (statement of Larry Pope) (“It 
seems the critical function—the really valuable function—that we ask 
examiners to do is to do the examination, to weigh prior art against the claimed 
invention.”).  
 177. See Craig Allen Nard, Certainty, Fence Building, and the Useful Arts, 
74 IND. L.J. 759, 799 n.153 (1999) (noting that claims must be “particular” and 
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Thus, issued claims are construed by reference to their “ordinary 
and customary meaning.”178 What is “ordinary and customary” is 
judged not by reference to the understanding of a member of the 
general public, but by reference to the understanding of a person 
having ordinary skill in the relevant art.179 This approach makes 
sense because patents are highly technical documents, which are 
meant to satisfy “[c]ompetitors[’] need to know not only what is 
protected by the claims, but also which aspects of the invention 
have been disclosed, but not claimed, and are thus, considered to 
have been dedicated to the public domain.”180 The inquiry into the 
meaning of the claims post-issuance is fundamentally different 
from the inquiry during examination.181 Although it is certainly 
possible and appropriate to attack patent validity in litigation,182 
the fundamental role of an issued claim is to put the public on 
notice as to what the patentee claims as his own property. 
Professor Chris Cotropia explained:  
The public notice function of patent claims now stands at the 
‘forefront of patent law jurisprudence.’ Both the Supreme 
Court and the Federal Circuit have emphasized the role the 
patent claim plays in informing the public of the subject 
matter a patent protects. 
                                                                                                     
“distinct” so that the public has fair notice of the bounds of the claimed 
invention); London v. Carson Pirie Scott & Co., 946 F.2d 1534, 1538 (Fed. Cir. 
1991) (same). 
 178. Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 
1996). 
 179. See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en 
banc) (“We have made clear, moreover, that the ordinary and customary 
meaning of a claim term is the meaning that the term would have to a person of 
ordinary skill in the art in question at the time of the invention.”). 
 180. Crissa A. Seymour Cook, Constructive Criticism: Phillips v. AWH Corp. 
and the Continuing Ambiguity of Patent Claim Construction Principles, 55 U. 
KAN. L. REV. 225, 268 n.28 (2006). 
 181. Compare In re Yamamoto, 740 F.2d 1569, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (“This 
approach serves the public interest by reducing the possibility that claims, 
finally allowed, will be given broader scope than is justified.”), with Chimie v. 
PPG Indus., Inc., 402 F.3d 1371, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“Courts construe claim 
terms in order to assign a fixed, unambiguous, legally operative meaning to the 
claim.” (emphasis added)). 
 182. See 35 U.S.C. § 282(b) (2012) (noting the different defenses that must 
be pleaded in “any action involving the validity or infringement of a patent”). 
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. . .  
Patent claims perform another function; they actually 
establish the scope of exclusivity afforded to an issued patent. 
That is, patent claims define the invention the patent will 
protect. This definitional function is tied to the claim's public 
notice function. The substantive function of a patent claim, 
however, goes well beyond the claim simply being locatable 
and open to public inspection. The claim tells the public the 
patent’s particular scope of exclusivity by defining the patent 
grant’s metes and bounds. This is the most fundamental trait 
of the modern patent claim. Through the claim’s words, the 
patent claim establishes the primary area of exclusivity the 
patentee will enjoy because of the patent grant. A claim 
resembles a land description in a deed because it defines the 
exact area protected by the legal instrument.183 
Patent applicants know the function of the claims and how the 
courts construe the claims. They know for whom the claims are 
being written and therefore “negotiate” the claim language with 
the Patent Office with an understanding of the scope each claim 
will be given.184 They do so because “[t]he patent claim’s scope is 
often dispositive for most patent issues. Once the subject matter 
the patent claim identifies is defined, infringement and validity 
questions usually are answered easily.”185  
It therefore matters a great deal how claims are construed. 
The patentee wishes to avoid an overly broad claim construction 
because that would greatly increase the chances of the claim 
being found invalid.186 In fact, if the patentee were led to believe 
that his claims would be given a broader construction post-
issuance, he would likely amend the claims further to reduce the 
possibility of the claims being found invalid.187 At the end of the 
                                                                                                     
 183. Christopher A. Cotropia, Patent Claim Interpretation Methodologies 
and Their Claim Scope Paradigms, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 49, 64–65 (2005) 
[hereinafter Cotropia, Claim Interpretation]. 
 184. See Osenga, supra note 168, at 136–37 (setting up the interplay 
between the inventor and the patent officer in terms of a negotiation, as the 
“inventor serves up the initial offer, the examiner counters,” with the intent to 
eventually reach a compromise). 
 185. Cotropia, Claim Interpretation, supra note 183, at 67. 
 186. See Yelderman, supra note 75, at 88–89 (“[T]he broader the claim, the 
more likely that an alleged infringer will be found to infringe it . . . .”). 
 187. Cf. Palmaz’s European Patents, [1999] RPC 47, 59 (Patents Ct.) (UK) 
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day “[t]he breadth of protection defines the patent's exclusionary 
power and how it can affect the technological development in the 
patent’s given industry. The scope of protection 
also . . . establish[es] how different an invention must be from an 
earlier accomplishment to warrant patent protection.”188 In other 
words, the breadth of the patent claim determines both the scope 
and the very existence of the patentee’s exclusive rights.189 
It should also be noted that, while claims may be—and often 
are—invalidated in litigation,190 once issued they are presumed 
valid.191 This presumption is codified in the Patent Act192 and has 
been construed for over a century to mean that the claims will not 
be invalidated except upon clear and convincing evidence of 
invalidity.193 This presumption accords a certain level of security 
to the patentees and is often the most valuable part of the patent 
grant.194 Indeed, cases often rise and fall (once claims are 
construed) on the presumption of validity. Thus, in Microsoft v. 
                                                                                                     
(“The purpose of making an amendment to a patent is to avoid a finding of 
invalidity.”).  
 188. Cotropia, Claim Interpretation, supra note 183, at 68. 
 189. See Tun-Jen Chiang, Fixing Patent Boundaries, 108 MICH. L. REV. 523, 
550–51 (2010) [hereinafter Chiang, Patent Boundaries] (“A nominally narrowing 
amendment to avoid prior art thus broadens the legal scope of the claim, and 
increases its monopoly cost, because the amendment transforms legal scope 
from zero to something greater.”). 
 190. See John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the 
Validity of Litigated Patents, 26 AIPLA Q.J. 185, 205–06 (1998) (reporting that 
about 48% of all litigated claims are found to be invalid); see also Mark A. 
Lemley, An Empirical Study of the Twenty-Year Patent Term, 22 AIPLA Q.J. 
369, 420 (1994) (reporting an invalidity rate of about 44%); Robert P. Merges, 
Commercial Success and Patent Standards: Economic Perspectives on 
Innovation, 76 CAL. L. REV. 803, 822 (1988) (same).  
 191. 35 U.S.C. § 282(a) (2012); see also Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 131 
S. Ct. 2238, 2242 (2011) (reiterating that a patent shall be presumed valid, and 
the burden of proving invalidity rests on the party asserting that invalidity).  
 192. 35 U.S.C. § 282(a) (“A patent shall be presumed valid. Each claim of a 
patent . . . shall be presumed valid independently of the validity of other 
claims . . . .”). 
 193. See i4i, 131 S. Ct. at 2245–46 (stating that the presumption of validity 
cannot be “overthrown except by clear and cogent evidence”). 
 194. See Yelderman, supra note 75, at 97–102 (using an algorithm to 
calculate the value of the presumption of validity and finding that the increase 
in a claim’s expected value depends on both the improvement in the likelihood of 
validity and the expected infringement value of the claim). 
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i4i,195 after the claims were construed, the question of validity 
came down to whether Microsoft, which had made a solid 
showing that the claims in question may well be invalid, made a 
“clear and convincing” showing.196 That requirement was the 
difference between a $200 million award as well as a prohibition 
on future infringing activities,197 and a finding of no liability for 
either past or future actions. The presumption of validity can 
thus be a tremendously valuable asset.  
In a one-two punch, however, the AIA created 
post-issuance proceedings that construe the claims more broadly 
than do court proceedings198 and that do not apply the same 
presumption of validity as courts.199 
C. Claim Construction in Post-Issuance Proceedings 
The AIA’s post-issuance proceedings, as the name implies, 
occur after the patent has issued. In other words, claims have 
been “negotiated” with the PTO, narrowing amendments and 
disclaimers have been made, and the patentee has created a 
record on which a person of ordinary skill in the art can rely to 
judge both the likelihood that his own activity is infringing and 
the likelihood that the claims in question are invalid.200 
                                                                                                     
 195. 131 S. Ct. 2238 (2011).  
 196. i4i Ltd. P’ship v. Microsoft Corp., 598 F.3d 831, 846–48 (Fed. Cir. 2010), 
aff’d, 131 S. Ct. 2238 (2011) (recognizing that, while Microsoft put on a strong 
case, it was not enough to carry the burden under the “clear and convincing” 
standard of proof).  
 197. See id. at 839 (discussing the lower court’s jury verdict of $200 million 
in damages to i4i as a result of the jury’s rejection of Microsoft’s argument that 
the patent was invalid). 
 198. 37 C.F.R. §§ 42.100(b), 42.300(b) (2012) (giving a claim the broadest 
reasonable construction in light of the “specification of the patent in which it 
appears”); see also infra Part III.C (discussing claim construction in post-
issuance proceedings and how the AIA gave claims the broadest reasonable 
meaning). 
 199. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 316(e), 326(e) (2012) (giving petitioners the burden of 
proving a proposition of unpatentability by a preponderance of the evidence). 
 200. See supra Part III.A (expanding on claim construction during the 
patent examination and the benefits and drawbacks to both broad and narrow 
claims).  
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Furthermore, the claims have acquired a presumption of 
validity that is only rebuttable by clear and convincing 
evidence.201 Or at least all of this was true until the passage of 
the America Invents Act.  
When the AIA was enacted, the PTO had to create rules 
that would govern the proceedings contemplated by the Act.202 
The Act itself left unresolved the question of which standard of 
claim construction to apply. Instead, the PTO decided the issue 
via rulemaking.203 The PTO chose to apply the “broadest 
reasonable construction” standard mostly on the strength of 
history.204 In adopting the rule, it provided no analysis of the 
propriety of this construction in the new trial-type proceedings 
at the PTO. Instead, it explained that such a practice is 
consistent with what the PTO had been doing in ex parte and 
inter partes reexamination “[f]or nearly thirty years.”205 The 
PTO noted that the “Federal Circuit has continued to require 
the Office to give patent claims their broadest reasonable 
construction consistent with the specification in patentability 
determination proceedings.”206 It further concluded that 
adhering to this rule is “consistent” with the legislative history 
of the AIA,207 and therefore refused to adopt the “perspective of 
                                                                                                     
 201. 35 U.S.C. § 282(a) (2012) (restating the presumption of validity of a 
patent claim, and putting the burden on the party asserting invalidity to 
overcome the presumption); Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 131 S. Ct. 2238, 
2242 (2011) (arguing that an invalidity defense must be proven by a clear and 
convincing evidence standard).  
 202. See In re Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC, No. 2014-1301, 2015 WL 4097949, 
at *5 (Fed. Cir. July 8, 2005) (Newman, J., dissenting) (noting that the AIA 
conveyed rulemaking authority to the PTO, and that the director shall prescribe 
regulations setting forth standards for instituting the AIA proceedings). 
 203. See id. (according to the rulemaking authority of the PTO, it 
promulgated 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b), which provided that a claim shall be given 
its broadest reasonable construction). 
 204. See 37 C.F.R. §§ 42.100(b), 42.200(b) (2012) (stating the rule); 77 Fed. 
Reg. 48,680, 48,688, 48,690, 48,697 (Aug. 14, 2012) (discussing the historical 
basis for the rule). 
 205. 77 Fed. Reg. at 48,697. 
 206. Id. 
 207. Id. 
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a person having ordinary skill in the art”208 as the governing 
standard.209 
Nonetheless, as Judge Pauline Newman pointed out in her 
dissent from the Federal Circuit upholding the PTO’s 
approach, while it is true that the court  
approved the use of ‘broadest reasonable interpretation’ as 
an expedient in examination and reexamination, [the] 
approval was based on the unfettered opportunity to amend 
in those proceedings. That opportunity is not present in 
Inter Partes Review; amendment of claims requires 
permission, and since the inception of Inter Partes Review, 
motions to amend have been granted in only two cases, 
although many have been requested.210  
In other words, unlike in other Patent Office proceedings, 
where the applicant is engaged in a process of negotiations 
with the Office over the scope of the claims,211 in IPR, the 
patentee is engaged in a process of litigation where the 
meaning of the claims is nearly fixed.212 Indeed, this was the 
very purpose Congress had in mind when it created the IPR. 
As the House report accompanying the bill stated, “[t]he Act 
converts inter partes reexamination from an examinational to 
an adjudicative proceeding.”213 The PTAB itself recognized as 
much, holding in an early IPR proceeding that “[a]n inter 
partes review is neither a patent examination nor a patent 
                                                                                                     
 208. Menell et al., Patent Case Management Judicial Guide, § 5.2.3.1.2 at 5–
49 (2d ed. 2012), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2114398 
(last visited Apr. 6, 2016). 
 209. See 77 Fed. Reg. 48,697 (Aug. 14 2012) (noting the historical roots of 
requiring the PTO to give patent claims their broadest reasonable construction 
consistent with the specification in patentability determination proceedings). 
 210. In re Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC, 778 F.3d 1271, 1287 (Fed. Cir. 2015) 
opinion withdrawn and superseded on reh’g, 2015 WL 4097949 (Fed. Cir. July 8, 
2015) (Newman, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
 211. See supra notes 169–174 and accompanying text (discussing the give 
and take negotiation style in which the applicant and PTO engage). 
 212. See Chimie v. PPG Indus., Inc., 402 F.3d 1371, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2005) 
(“Courts construe claim terms in order to assign a fixed, unambiguous, legally 
operative meaning to the claim.”). 
 213. H.R. REP. NO. 112–98, pt. 1, at 46 (2011). 
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reexamination.”214 Rather, it is a trial, adjudicatory in nature 
and constitutes litigation.”215 The PTAB further noted that there 
are no “prosecution activities” in an IPR.216 
Making matters worse still, the AIA required the PTO to 
dispense with the “clear and convincing” standard for the 
showing of invalidity.217 Instead, a challenger to any issued claim 
carries her burden by meeting a much laxer “preponderance of 
the evidence” standard.218 The upshot is that the Patent Office 
adopted IPR rules that nullified the expectations of the patentees 
about the scope of their patent rights, and it did so without a 
meaningful opportunity to “renegotiate” those rights with the 
PTO, while the Act itself undermined, if not altogether abolished, 
what is perhaps the most meaningful component of a patent 
right—the robust presumption of validity.219 The effect of this 
“one-two punch” is discussed in the next Part. 
D. The Effect of the Post-Issuance Review Process 
The distinctions regarding claim construction and quantum 
of proof required in Article III courts versus those required in 
PTAB proceedings are not just grist for an academic debate. 
Instead, these distinctions have dramatic effects in the “real 
world.” It has always been the case that some of the patents duly 
issued by the Patent Office are thereafter invalidated by a 
judicial decision.220 Some of these invalidations stem from the 
                                                                                                     
214.  Idle Free Sys., Inc. v. Bergstrom, Inc., IPR2012-00027, Docket No. 26, 
at 7 (P.T.A.B. June 11, 2013). 
 215. Google, Inc. v. Jongerius Panoramic Techs., LLC, IPR2013-00191, 
Docket No. 50, at 4 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 13, 2014) (granting motion for pro hac vice 
admission). 
 216. Id. 
 217. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 316(e), 326(e) (2012) (establishing a preponderance of 
the evidence standard when the petitioner has the burden to prove a proposition 
of unpatentability). 
 218. Id. 
 219. See id. § 282(a) (providing the presumption of validity for patent 
claims). 
 220. See supra note 190 (reporting percentages of how many litigated claims 
are found to be invalid); ARGUMENTS BEFORE THE COMM. ON PATENTS, H.R. MIS. 
DOC. 50, at 135–36 (2d Sess. 1878) (argument of J.J. Storrow) (discussing the 
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PTO misapprehending the law or applying the law incorrectly,221 
while others may originate in the PTO not being aware of some 
invalidating prior art,222 and others still due to the patentee 
committing fraud on the PTO.223 That granted patents can be 
invalidated is not a surprise to anyone—including patentees 
themselves—and is and has always been part of the legal 
landscape. Indeed, when markets valuate a patent, they take into 
account the possibility that upon judicial scrutiny the patent may 
be found to be invalid.224 A study by Professors Mark Lemley and 
John Allison showed that the rate of invalidation in judicial 
proceedings is just under 50%.225 Yet, that includes all causes of 
invalidation, and not just invalidation for lack of novelty or 
obviousness. Invalidation for these two causes is limited to about 
33% of litigated patents.226 Another recent study by Shawn Miller 
that attempted to quantify the proper invalidation rate, 
suggested that about 28% of all patents are invalid if subjected to 
correct anticipation or obviousness analysis.227 According to this 
                                                                                                     
benefits of patents and explaining that they are only granted to inventors who 
have created a new and useful art or composition of matter). 
 221. See, e.g., Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. 
Ct. 1289, 1305 (2012) (invalidating a granted patent because the PTO 
misapprehended the proper test for patentability under 35 U.S.C. § 101). 
 222. See Tun-Jen Chiang, The Upside-Down Inequitable Conduct Defense, 
107 NW. U. L. REV. 1243, 1249 (2013) (noting that the PTO will often 
erroneously issue a patent on the belief that it is valid, when in fact it is invalid 
due to the vastness of prior art).  
 223. See Christopher R. Leslie, Patents of Damocles, 83 IND. L.J. 133, 137 
(2008) (considering the multiple ways in which patent applicants can commit 
fraud upon the PTO, for example by failing to disclose material information or 
by submitting false information). 
 224. See Hovenkamp, Janis & Lemley, supra note 21, at 1761 
(acknowledging the fact that a significant number of patents that make it to 
court are ultimately held invalid). 
 225. See Allison & Lemley, supra note 190, at 205–06 (noting that there is a 
wide disparity of validity rates across regional circuits, even though the average 
rate of all the circuits was just under 50%). For other studies confirming the 
same approximate invalidity rates, see supra note 190.  
 226. Allison & Lemley, supra note 190, at 209 (citing obviousness as the 
most frequently used basis for judicial invalidation of patents). 
 227. See Shawn P. Miller, Where’s the Innovation: An Analysis of the 
Quantity and Qualities of Anticipated and Obvious Patents, 18 VA. J.L. & TECH. 
1, 6–7 (2013) (showing that the results of the author’s study suggest that the 
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study, the courts are invalidating roughly as many patents as 
they should be invalidating based on these criteria if they were 
getting the law correct all the time. Indeed, the courts are 
somewhat over-invalidating patents, but the numbers are in line 
with what the Miller study predicts ought to be happening.228  
The invalidation numbers in the post-issuance proceedings 
are starkly different. The rate of invalidation in IPR proceedings 
exceeds 75% of all claims subject to adjudication.229 The CBMR 
numbers are more eye-popping still. In the CBMR proceedings 
the claims are invalidated at a rate of over 90%.230 The question 
is what accounts for such disparity between district court 
invalidation rates and PTAB invalidation rates. 
One possible answer is that the patents tested in the PTA 
crucible are just weaker and, therefore, are more likely to be 
invalidated. Under this hypothesis, the high percentage of 
invalidation at the PTAB indicates nothing other than selection 
bias. This hypothesis suggests that, if the same patents were 
litigated in court, the invalidation rate would be much the same. 
The problem with this line of thinking, however, is that a number 
of patents that have been invalidated in the PTAB proceedings 
have gone through litigation—including an appeal to the Federal 
Circuit.231 Although the patent survived the litigation unscathed, 
the PTO ordered an IPR or CBMR of the patents in question and 
then invalidated the challenged claims at the same rate as it did 
for patents that have not been through the crucible of 
                                                                                                     
patent system’s efficiency is harmed by the existence of too many non-innovative 
patents). 
 228. Compare id. (suggesting a proper invalidity rate of 28% based on 
anticipation and obviousness), with Allison & Lemley, supra note 190, at 209 
(reporting a 33% district court invalidation rate based on these same criteria).  
 229. See Dolin, Dubious Patent Reform, supra note 3, at 926 (“Looking at the 
total number of claims in all IPRs that have been considered by the PTAB 
versus the number of claims that survived, the same general picture emerges—a 
nearly 75% invalidation rate.”). 
 230. See id. at 930 (“The per-case invalidation rate in CBMR is over 90% and 
per-claim rate is over 94%.”). 
 231. Id. at 927–29 (“One reason to doubt that the patents in the first wave of 
IPR are particularly ‘weak’ is the fact that a number of them have been through 
litigation or reexamination or both.”). 
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litigation.232 Other data also undermine the “selection bias” 
hypothesis. Thus, 
only 31% of IPR petitions rely only on “new” (i.e., previously 
unconsidered) prior art. Three percent rely on old art or art 
that was already considered by the patent examiner and not 
found to be invalidating, and 66% rely on a mixture of old and 
new art. But, all of the petitions are successful at high levels. 
Of the final written decisions, petitions relying on new art only 
and old art only result in the identical invalidation rate of 
93%, while those relying on mixture of old and new art result 
in the invalidation rate of 81%.233 
Additionally, “15% of patents in IPR have been involved in 
and emerged from a previous reexamination . . . . Of these 
patents that have already received [this] second favorable look, 
60% were fully invalidated in the IPR proceedings, and 8% were 
partially invalidated, for a per claim invalidation rate of 83%.”234 
Thus, the data undermines the hypothesis that the reason for 
high invalidation rate is selection bias and the weakness of the 
patents in the IPR. The patents being invalidated in these 
proceedings are not egregiously weak.235 Instead, these are 
patents that have survived litigation and reexamination—and 
sometimes both.236 Something else must then be at work.  
The financial markets also recognize that it is not the 
inherent weakness of the patents that drives the high 
invalidation rate at the PTAB. For example, the stock market 
reacted very negatively to the news that an IPR was requested on 
a particular patent, though that patent had been upheld in prior 
litigation and a federal jury had concluded it was worth $300 
million.237 The mere fact that an IPR petition was filed caused 
the patentee’s stock to plummet “by 25%, which translated into a 
                                                                                                     
 232. Id. at 927–31 (noting that the PTO may still invalidate a patent during 
an IPR or CBMR even after it was ruled valid through litigation). 
 233. Id. at 928. 
 234. Id. at 927. 
 235. See id. (providing reasons to doubt that the patents in the first wave of 
IPR are particularly weak). 
 236. Id. 
 237. Id. at 932–33 (“[T]he system can be used to destroy not just the value of 
a patent, but the value of a patentee’s entire enterprise.”). 
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250 million dollar loss in market capitalization.”238 This 
happened before the PTAB decided whether to institute a trial 
with respect to the challenged patent, much less adjudicated the 
merits of the dispute.239 One would have thought that a patent 
that has survived litigation after a strong challenge by, of all 
parties, Apple240—a company with nearly limitless resources—
would be in no danger from the “second look” administered by the 
PTO. Yet, the collective market wisdom concluded otherwise. The 
reason it concluded otherwise, and the reason for the disparity in 
invalidation rates between the courts and the PTAB, is the 
difference in claim construction and the burden of proof on the 
patent challenger in these fora.241 
Before moving on to the next Part, we wish to address the 
question of why reexamination was so much less “deadly” to 
patents than current post-issuance procedures. After all, in both 
ex parte and inter partes reexamination, claims were given their 
broadest reasonable construction.242 Yet, the “kill” rate in 
reexamination was much lower than what is seen in IPR and 
CBMR. For example, in ex parte reexamination, 25% of patents 
emerge completely unscathed, while another “two-thirds of the 
patents exit reexamination with some changes made to the 
claims.243 Only 12% of all patents that enter reexamination fail to 
                                                                                                     
 238. Id. at 933. 
 239. See id. (showing that just the ability to request IPR is a powerful tool). 
 240. See VirnetX, Inc. v. Apple Inc., 925 F. Supp. 2d 816, 825 (E.D. Tex. 
2013) (demonstrating that not even a powerful company like Apple can escape 
the second look administered by the PTO), aff’d in part, vacated in part, rev’d in 
part sub nom. VirnetX, Inc. v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 767 F.3d 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
 241. See Dolin, Dubious Patent Reform, supra note 3, at 903 (“[I]nstead of 
becoming an alternative avenue to resolving issues of patent validity, the 
reexamination process simply bifurcates the dispute resolution in two different 
fora.”). 
 242. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.552 (2012) (ex parte reexamination); 37 C.F.R. § 1.906 
(inter partes reexamination); see also Scope of Inter Partes Reexamination, 
MANUAL OF PAT. EXAMINING PROCEDURE (MPEP), U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFFICE 
(Nov. 2015), http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/s2658.html (last visited 
Apr. 25, 2016) (stating that “[i]nter partes reexamination does not, however, 
differ from ex parte reexamination as to the substance to be considered in the 
proceeding”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).   
 243. See Dolin, Dubious Patent Reform, supra note 3, at 923–24 (“[N]early a 
quarter of all patents exit the reexamination with all claims confirmed.”).  
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receive the reexamination certificate.”244 The inter partes 
reexamination was somewhat less favorable to the patentees, but 
still not as likely to invalidate a patent as IPR or CBMR. In inter 
partes reexamination, 31% of patents had all of the challenged 
claims rejected and 8% of all of the claims confirmed.245 The 
remaining 61% of patents survived only following claim 
amendments.246 The picture that emerges from these data is that 
the key to post-issuance proceedings in the PTO under the 
“broadest reasonable construction” standard is the “unfettered 
opportunity to amend in those proceedings.”247 This ability is de 
facto absent in the AIA-created procedures.248 In the first thirty 
months of AIA procedures, only two—out of more than fifty—
motions to amend claims were granted, resulting in twenty-two 
amended claims being allowed.249 Making matters even more 
dramatic, out of those three motions, one was in relation to a 
patent owned by the U.S. government, and the motion 
encountered no opposition from the patent challenger.250 The 
PTAB explained that in post-issuance proceedings, the patentee 
has no right to amend the claims and held that the law “places 
the burden on the patent owner to show a patentable distinction 
of each proposed substitute claim over the prior art.”251 The 
                                                                                                     
 244. Id. 
 245. See U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., INTER PARTES REEXAMINATION FILING 
DATA—SEPT. 30, 2013, at 1, http://www.uspto.gov/patents/stats/inter_parte_ 
historical_stats_roll_up_EOY2013.pdf (providing data on the number of IPR 
requests and filings). 
 246. See id. (providing additional data on IPR requests and filings). 
 247. In re Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC, 778 F.3d 1271, 1287 (Fed. Cir. 2015) 
(Newman, J., dissenting) opinion withdrawn and superseded on reh’g 2015 WL 
4097949 (Fed. Cir. July 8, 2015). 
 248. See id. (“[W]hen claims in reexamination are not eligible for 
amendment . . . the PTO instructs examiners not to use the broadest reasonable 
interpretation.”); In re Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC, No. 2014-1301, 2015 WL 
4100060, at *4 (Fed. Cir. July 8, 2015) (Prost, C.J., Newman, Moore, O’Malley, 
Reyna, JJ., dissenting) (“IPRs do not bear the traits that justify the broadest 
reasonable construction . . . there is no robust right to amend.”). 
 249. See Dolin, Dubious Patent Reform, supra note 3, at 929 (noting that the 
advantage of PTAB’s motion to amend claims is purely ephemeral).  
 250. See id. (“In every other case (forty-eight in total), the motion to amend 
was denied.”). 
 251. Idle Free Sys., Inc. v. Bergstrom, Inc., IPR2012-00027, Docket No. 26, 
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PTAB denied motions to amend when it viewed the patentee’s 
arguments as insufficiently detailed to explain why the proposed 
amendments would be patentable.252 This posture is in stark 
contrast with initial patent examination and reexamination. In 
those procedures, it is the examiner that bears the initial burden 
of proof to show that the claim as presented by the applicant is 
unpatentable in view of any of the requirements of the Patent 
Act.253 
Thus, unlike the reexamination where two-thirds of the 
claims are amended and then exit the reexamination process 
confirmed in this new form,254 the opportunity to amend in IPR 
and CBMR is ephemeral at best. In In re Cuozzo,255 five judges of 
the Federal Circuit noted as much, writing in a rare joint dissent 
from the court’s refusal to take up the issue of proper claim 
construction in IPR en banc that 
[d]uring IPRs, there is no back-and-forth between the patentee 
and examiner seeking to resolve claim scope ambiguity; there 
is no robust right to amend. . . . During this process, the 
patentee is not given the right to amend its claims, but must 
instead seek the permission of the Board. Even then, the 
patentee is limited to “one motion to amend,” with additional 
motions allowed only “to materially advance the settlement of 
                                                                                                     
at 7 (P.T.A.B. June 11, 2013). 
 252. See, e.g., ScentAir Tech., Inc. v. Prolitec, Inc., IPR2013-00179, Docket 
No. 60, at 27–30 (2015) (showing the increased difficulty for a patentee 
attempting to amend claims); see also PTAB Decision Highlights Little Used 
Claim Amendment Process in America Invents Act Patent Challenges, FISH & 
RICHARDSON (June 17, 2015) http://fishpostgrant.com/alert/ptab-decision-
highlights-aia-patent-challenges/ (last visited Apr. 22, 2016) (describing a 
patentee’s difficulty in amending his or her claims) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review). 
 253. See In re Oetiker, 977 F.2d 1443, 1445 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (“[I]f the 
applicant can provide evidence or argument in support of unobviousness, such 
evidence and argument will be considered, and the question of patentability will 
be redecided on the entire record.”). 
 254. See supra note 244 and accompanying text (“[T]wo-thirds of the patents 
exit reexamination with some changes to the claim . . . .”). 
 255. In re Cuozzo Speed Techs., Inc., No. 2014-1301, 2015 WL 4100060 (Fed. 
Cir. July 8, 2015) 
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a proceeding” or “as permitted by regulations prescribed by the 
Director.”256 
In short, unlike the previous “second look” regimes, IPR and 
CBMR have both drastically changed the scope of the right that 
the patentees thought they bargained for and failed to provide 
them with a meaningful substitute for the vested rights lost. 
Nevertheless, before addressing the constitutionality of this 
action, we need to consider the law of takings generally as it has 
developed over time.  
IV. The History of Eminent Domain 
For nearly as long as there has been a concept of “private 
property,” governments have expressly or inherently retained the 
right to reclaim that property for uses that they have deemed 
appropriate.257 In the United States, the Fifth Amendment to the 
Constitution expressly reserves the right to take personal 
property from private individuals while providing that no 
property shall be taken without some form of payment.258 The 
Takings Clause states that “nor shall private property be taken 
for public use, without just compensation.”259 Yet, as the case law 
has developed over time, in particular since the Industrial 
Revolution, the government has increased its ability to take 
property from private citizens, both by creating new means of 
taking, such as through zoning and city planning,260 and by 
broadening the definition of “public use” to the point where 
virtually any use could be conceived of as for the public benefit.261  
                                                                                                     
 256. Id. at *4 (Prost, C.J., Newman, Moore, O’Malley, Reyna, JJ., dissenting 
from denial of rehearing en banc). 
 257. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (elaborating on the “Takings Clause,” which 
allows the government to take property if just compensation is provided). 
 258. Id. 
 259. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 260. For a discussion on the adoption of city planning in the United States 
and the role of eminent domain, see J. S. Young, City Planning and Restrictions 
on the Use of Property, 9 MINN. L. REV. 518, 520 (1924–1925) (stating that the 
United States has four means of acquiring private property for public use, 
including “taxation, proprietary, eminent domain, and police [powers]”). 
 261. See, e.g., Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005) (expanding 
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A. The Fifth Amendment and the Takings Clause 
In the years surrounding the adoption of the Constitution, 
there was a deep-seated and continuing distrust of a large and 
powerful government. While never denying that there may be 
instances in which utilitarianism would doubtlessly permit 
certain property takings, the drafters of the Constitution included 
a restriction: the requirement that property owners be 
compensated for any such taking.262 The “just compensation” 
portion of the clause was entirely new, moving beyond simple due 
process toward an official recognition that land had value to the 
owner because he had made the effort to improve the land and 
make it useful.263 Just because the land could be more useful to 
others did not mean that the owner’s right to use the land for his 
own benefit could be unilaterally usurped. In the bundle of sticks, 
the property owner had as much right to not use the land as he 
did to use it. Eminent domain would allow the government to 
take land that could be used for the common good while 
acknowledging that the property had some value to its previous 
owner, even if the owner chose not to use it for any particular 
purpose.264  
As the post-Civil War era turned into the Industrial 
Revolution, and then into the Civil Rights Movement, the 
questions of procedural and substantive due process would begin 
to shape the parallel law on takings and eminent domain.  
                                                                                                     
the definition of “public use” to include the concept of economic development). 
 262. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall private property be taken for 
public use, without just compensation.”).  
 263. Id. 
 264. Some might argue that this is the inherent flaw in Locke’s labor theory. 
If a man who has acquired land through his hard work chooses then to let the 
land go fallow, is that not his right? Locke argues that once land is acquired, it 
would be wasteful not to put it to its use, “for it is labour indeed that puts the 
value on everything.” John Locke, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT § 40 (Hollis 
ed., 1689). Under that theory, the government should not have to pay to take 
land that is not actively cultivated or put to use. 
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B. Without Due Process of Law 
The Fifth Amendment clearly states that no man shall lose 
life, liberty, or property without due process of law.265 Due 
process is both procedural—a question of the process of the 
government (did a citizen get some kind of hearing)—and 
substantive, meaning the Court was allowed to review the 
“substance” of the legislation in question via the Due Process 
Clause.266 As states tried to rebuild and aggrieved private parties 
filed Fifth Amendment Takings claims, courts continually 
reviewed the new legislation to ensure the laws were fair to all 
parties involved. 
In 1922, the U.S. Supreme Court overturned a Pennsylvania 
regulation that was intended to protect the rights of individual 
landowners from the dangerous methods employed by mining 
companies.267 The landmark case of Pennsylvania Coal v. 
Mahon,268 involved regulations prohibiting corporations from 
mining coal in the ground under streets, houses, and places of 
public assembly. Pennsylvania Coal held the mineral rights to 
numerous properties whose surface rights were owned by other—
often unsuspecting—individuals to whom Pennsylvania Coal had 
sold them.269 The legislation had been enacted to protect the 
residents from unanticipated cave-ins and other dangers 
associated with living and working on the surface while the coal 
mine dredged the land literally out from under them.270 
Pennsylvania Coal argued successfully that the prohibition of 
mining amounted to a government taking without just 
compensation in violation of the Fifth Amendment.271 The 
Supreme Court held that, though property regulation may be 
                                                                                                     
 265. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 266. See Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 661 (1887) (“They [the courts] are 
at liberty, indeed, are under solemn duty, to look at the substance of things, 
whenever they enter upon the inquiry whether the legislature has transcended 
the limits of its authority.”). 
 267. Pa. Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922). 
 268. Id. 
 269. Id. at 412. 
 270. Id. at 418–19. 
 271. Id. at 416. 
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permitted, where “the regulation goes too far,”272 as it did here, 
the overly restrictive law amounts to a compensable taking. 
Despite the Court’s finding that a taking had occurred, no 
compensation was ordered.273 Presumably, resumption of mining 
was compensation enough to the mining company.  
On the heels of its decision in Pennsylvania Coal, the 
Supreme Court heard a series of cases involving new—to the 
United States274—regulatory techniques called “zoning” and 
urban planning. Two of these cases were in tension with one 
another: Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty275 and Nectow v. City 
of Cambridge.276 In Euclid, the plaintiff challenged a generalized 
zoning and city plan on the grounds that the structured 
assignment of commercial and industrial zones denied the 
property owners due process of law in that they had no 
opportunity to challenge the designation.277 The Court, however, 
upheld the zoning ordinance as a “valid exercise of authority,”278 
ruling that zoning laws are not, as a general category, 
unconstitutional restrictions on the rights of the property 
owner.279 The Court went so far as to declare: 
[W]e are not prepared to say that the end in view was not 
sufficient to justify the general rule of the ordinance . . . . It 
cannot be said that the ordinance in this respect passes the 
bounds of reason and assumes the character of a merely 
arbitrary fiat. Moreover, the restrictive provisions of the 
ordinance in this particular may be sustained upon the 
principles applicable to the broader exclusion from residential 
districts of all business and trade structures.280  
The public interest in “increas[ing] the safety and security of 
home life . . . by reducing the traffic and resulting confusion in 
                                                                                                     
 272. Id. at 415. 
 273. Id. at 416. 
 274. For a discussion of the United States’ slow adoption of city planning 
and zoning, see generally J. S. Young, supra note 262. 
 275. 272 U.S. 365 (1926). 
 276. 277 U.S. 183 (1928). 
 277. Euclid, 272 U.S. at 379. 
 278. Id. 
 279. Id. 
 280. Id. at 389 (internal citation omitted).  
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residential sections, decreas[ing] noise and other conditions 
which produce or intensify nervous disorders, [and] preserv[ing] a 
more favorable environment in which to rear children,”281 clearly 
surpassed the right of the property owner to use his property as 
he desired.282  
Conversely, in Nectow, the Court found that, while the 
zoning ordinance in question was constitutionally sound in 
general, it was unsustainable as applied to the particular 
plaintiff.283 In Nectow, the zoning ordinance itself seemed to be 
facially similar to that in Euclid, wherein zones for residential, 
industrial and unrestricted use were created. Though the Court 
found that the ordinance met the new “substantial relation to the 
public health, safety, morals, or general welfare”284 standard set 
forth in Euclid, it held that the ordinance as applied to this 
particular plaintiff was “an invasion of the property of plaintiff 
[and] was serious and highly injurious.”285 Yet, the only remedy 
offered in this instance was an injunction preventing enforcement 
of the ordinance, not compensation for the taking.286 Oddly, the 
handful of cases evaluated during this time focused on the 
substantive due process rationale rather than on the terms of the 
Takings Clause itself, and they generally failed to offer any type 
of compensation when a taking was found.287 
The message of these early cases on takings was that, while 
the government was allowed to regulate private property to some 
extent and even when that diminished the value of the property, 
the Takings Clause would be triggered by the removal of 
particular elements from the “bundle of sticks.” The fight 
continued, however, about the kind and degree of protection 
appropriate in this context.  
                                                                                                     
 281. Id. at 394.  
 282. Id. at 396–97. 
 283. Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 188–89 (1928). 
 284. Id. at 188. 
 285. Id. 
 286. Id. at 188–89. 
 287. See, e.g., id. (offering an injunction as a remedy but not just 
compensation for the taking). 
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C. All Aboard Penn Central, with Stops at Agins, Lingle, Lucas, 
and Loretto 
1. Penn Central and the World of Regulatory Takings 
In 1978, the Supreme Court returned to its long-dormant and 
largely unchallenged Pennsylvania Coal takings analysis to 
determine whether a local government had gone "too far" in 
denying an owner’s right to develop and largely reshape a New 
York landmark, Grand Central Terminal.288 The developer 
challenged an ordinance that prevented any redevelopment of 
sites labeled as historic landmarks.289 The plaintiff urged that 
preventing him from utilizing the valuable space on top of Grand 
Central Terminal amounted to a taking.290 In its takings 
analysis, the Court enumerated three factors of particular 
significance: (1) the economic impact of the regulation on the 
claimant; (2) the extent to which the regulation has interfered 
with distinct investment-backed expectations;291 and (3) the 
character of the governmental action, including an analysis of 
whether the taking was a physical taking or merely had the effect 
of a taking.292 In evaluating the economic impact of the refusal to 
allow “upward” development of the landmark property, the Court 
found that, in light of its newly enumerated test, the public 
benefit far outweighed any potential economic loss to the 
owner.293 Though the underlying question of whether “some” 
compensation qualified as “just” compensation went unanswered 
by the Court,294 it was ultimately determined that some 
                                                                                                     
 288. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
 289. Id. at 118. 
 290. For a discussion on “air rights” broadly, a theme that seemingly 
befuddled the Court in Penn Central, see generally Frank Schnidman & 
Cameron Roberts, Municipal Air Rights: New York City’s Proposal to Sell Air 
Rights over Public Buildings and Public Spaces, 15 URB. L. 347 (1983). 
 291. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124. 
 292. Id. 
 293. See id. at 138 (“The restrictions imposed are substantially related to the 
promotion of the general welfare and not only permit reasonable beneficial use 
of the landmark site but also afford appellants opportunities further to 
enhance . . . the Terminal site . . . .”). 
 294. See id. at 137 (discussing the issue of transferable development rights 
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compensation was apparently better than none, and the zoning 
regulations stood.295 
2. Agins v. City of Tiburon 
Just three short years later, the Court reconfigured its 
regulation-takings analysis into a two-part “either or” test. In 
Agins v. City of Tiburon,296 the Court asked whether the 
regulation “substantially advanced a legitimate state interest” or 
whether the regulation “denied an owner economically viable use 
of land.”297 The Court suddenly viewed the question of regulatory 
taking as a question of whether the Nectow (substantial state 
interest) or Penn Central (economically viable use of the land) 
analysis should apply rather than a combination of the two 
analyses.298 The Agins Court enunciated that, because plaintiffs 
were free to pursue their residential development elsewhere, 
there could be no taking and that the zoning regulations in 
question did not deny the “justice and fairness guaranteed by the 
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.”299 Agins adopted the 
economic analysis of Penn Central without consideration for the 
compelling state interest.  
3. Lingle v. Chevron USA, Inc. 
Agins was, however, a short-lived rule, abrogated twenty-five 
years later in Lingle v. Chevron USA Inc.,300 which eliminated 
                                                                                                     
as a partial solution which granted the owners of Grand Central some value to 
the lost space above the landmark property). 
 295. The Court took into account the existence of transferable development 
rights that the plaintiffs in the case received as part of the regulatory scheme 
and that had the potential to diminish the financial blow to them; this led the 
Court to conclude that an adjustment rather than deprivation of property rights 
was taking place. Id. at 137–38.  
 296. 447 U.S. 255 (1980). 
 297. Id. at 260. 
 298. Id. 
 299. Id. at 263. 
 300. 544 U.S. 528 (2005). 
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the “substantially advanced a legitimate state interest” prong.301 
The Lingle Court at long last declared that the substantial 
advancement test was clearly not a constitutional factor 
enumerated in the Takings Clause and had been an improperly 
judicially created standard.302 The issue in Lingle focused on 
lease limitations on gas stations.303 The Hawaii legislature 
enacted a law limiting gas station leases to no more than 15% of 
fuel sales gross profits and 15% of profits from non-fuel sales.304 
The Chevron Corporation argued that the limitation amounted to 
a taking and the trial court disagreed.305 It held, in line with 
Penn Central, that Chevron would essentially “win some, lose 
some” and because there was not a complete loss of value in the 
property, and the taking substantially advanced a government 
interest in protecting the gas dealers and the public from high 
prices, there could be no taking.306 Upon review, the Supreme 
Court unanimously held that Agins’ substantial advancement 
prong was an evaluation of the Due Process Clause, not the 
Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment and was therefore not 
the appropriate evaluation.307 Lingle in effect swung the 
pendulum back from the substantive due process evaluation the 
Court had been using since Pennsylvania Coal to the literal “just 
compensation” analysis that is set forth in the language of the 
Takings Clause. 
                                                                                                     
 301. Id. at 540.  
 302. See id. at 540–43 (“There is no question that the ‘substantially 
advances’ formula was derived from due process, not takings, precedent.”). 
 303. Id. at 528. 
 304. Id. 
 305. Id. at 532–34.  
 306. See id. at 533 (“Chevron swiftly moved for summary judgment on its 
takings claim, arguing that the rent cap does not substantially advance any 
legitimate government interest.”). 
 307. Id. at 540. 
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4. Lucas and Loretto as Tests for Total Regulatory and Physical 
Takings 
The Lingle court relied on the parallel theories of “total 
regulatory taking,” as set forth in Lucas v. South Carolina 
Coastal Council,308 and of “physical takings” in Loretto v. 
Teleprompter309 to justify the shift away from state interest back 
toward the injury to the property owner.310 Lucas established 
that a total regulatory taking occurs when regulations completely 
deprive an owner of “all economically beneficial use,”311 while 
Loretto established that a physical taking occurred when a 
property owner suffers a permanent physical invasion of her 
property—at the hands of the government or a private party—
even when that taking is relatively minor, such as the 
installation of a cable wire on the front and roof of one’s 
apartment building.312 When either type of taking occurs, the 
intruding party must provide just compensation.  
When it comes to Loretto, the intrusion that the plaintiff in 
the case suffered was insignificant in regard to the decline in 
value incurred, given that it was equipment mostly consisting of 
cables and cable boxes affixed to the outside of a building.313 
Nonetheless, the Court stated that a permanent physical 
occupation “is perhaps the most serious form of invasion of an 
owner’s property interests. . . . [T]he government does not simply 
take a single ‘strand’ from the ‘bundle’ of property rights: it chops 
through the bundle, taking a slice of every strand.”314 It added 
that “property law has long protected an owner’s expectation that 
he will be relatively undisturbed at least in the possession of his 
property. To require, as well, that the owner permit another to 
                                                                                                     
 308. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).  
 309. 458 U.S. 419 (1982). 
 310. See id. at 441 (affirming that a permanent physical occupation of 
property is a taking, even if the permanent installation is of minimal size).  
 311. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019.  
 312. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 435.  
 313. See id. at 422 (describing the intrusion as “a cable slightly less than 
one-half inch in diameter and of approximately 30 feet in length” along with 
“two large silver boxes”). 
 314. Id. at 435. 
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exercise complete dominion literally adds insult to injury.”315 
Last, the Court emphasized that permanent occupations present 
few issues of proof.316 
D. Sour Grapes in Horne v. Department of Agriculture 
Recently, the Supreme Court decided a case dealing with an 
administrative marketing order that required growers to set 
aside a certain percentage of raisin crops for the government at 
no charge and with at most the hope of recouping a percentage of 
the government’s profits when selling the raisins, should those 
profits exist.317 The petitioner refused to set aside raisins, 
arguing that this was an unconstitutional taking, and the 
government fined the petitioners the fair market value of the 
raisins plus civil penalties as a result.318 The Court held that this 
constituted a taking under the Fifth Amendment, which was of 
particular significance because it was the first time that the 
Court unambiguously applied the Takings Clause to personal 
property rather than real property.319 Notably, the Court did not 
mince words when it stated: “Nothing in this history suggests 
                                                                                                     
 315. Id. at 436. 
 316. See id. at 437 (“The placement of a fixed structure on land or real 
property is an obvious fact that will rarely be subject to dispute.”). 
 317. See Horne v. Dep’t of Agric., 135 S. Ct. 2419, 2424–25 (2015) (setting 
forth the facts of the case and noting that “[t]he question is whether the Takings 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment bars the Government from imposing such a 
demand on the growers without just compensation”). 
 318. See id. at 2425 (noting that the Hornes were fined an amount “equal to 
the market value of the missing raisins—some $480,000—as well as an 
additional civil penalty of just over $200,000 for disobeying the order to turn 
them over”).  
 319. See id. at 2425–28 (answering in the negative the question of 
“[w]hether the government’s ‘categorical duty’ under the Fifth Amendment to 
pay just compensation when it ‘physically takes possession of an interest in 
property’ . . . applies only to real property and not to personal property”); Tom 
W. Bell, “Property” in the Constitution: The View From the Third Amendment, 
20 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1243, 1246 (2012) (discussing “precedents 
suggesting that the Takings Clause protects personal property less completely 
than it does real property”). 
TAKING PATENTS 771 
that personal property was any less protected against physical 
appropriation than real property.”320 It went on to explain: 
[A patent] confers upon the patentee an exclusive property in 
the patented invention which cannot be appropriated or used 
by the government itself, without just compensation, any more 
than it can appropriate or use without compensation land 
which has been patented to a private purchaser.321 
This reconfirms the Court’s position that patents are the 
beneficiaries of Fifth Amendment protection just as much as 
pieces of land.322  
The Supreme Court further explained that the government’s 
decision to take possession and control of the raisins results in a 
taking as much “as if the Government held full title and 
ownership.”323 The Court noted that the growers’ retention of “a 
contingent interest of indeterminate value does not mean there 
has been no physical taking, particularly since the value of the 
interest depends on the discretion of the taker, and may be 
worthless, as it was for one of the two years at issue here.”324 The 
government’s argument that the regulatory scheme resulted in 
higher prices for the remaining raisins did not sway the Court to 
hold that no taking had occurred.325 This entire line of reasoning 
would presumably apply in the patent context as well, and even 
contingent interests in patents would not eliminate the 
possibility that a taking took place. The Horne case shows that 
                                                                                                     
 320. Horne, 135 S. Ct. at 2427. 
 321. Id. (quoting James v. Campbell, 104 U.S. 356, 358 (1882)). 
 322. See Adam Mossoff, Supreme Court Recognizes That Patents Are 
Property, CTR. FOR THE PROTECTION OF INTELL. PROP. BLOG, June 22, 2015, 
http://cpip.gmu.edu/2015/06/22/supreme-court-recognizes-that-patents-are-property/ 
(last visited Apr. 22, 2016) (“I am pleased to see the Supreme Court reiterate 
what it said over a century ago: A patented invention stands the same as other 
types of property, and its taking by the government without adequate 
compensation is unconstitutionally unjust.”) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review). 
 323. Horne, 135 S. Ct. at 2428 (quoting Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan 
CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 431 (1982)). 
 324. Id. at 2429. 
 325. See id. at 2432 (rejecting the “notion that general regulatory activity 
such as enforcement of quality standards can constitute just compensation for a 
specific physical taking”). 
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even when some interest remains in personal property, a category 
in which the Court also situates patents, a taking can occur.326 
V. Post-Issuance Review as a Taking 
A. Are Patents Property? 
There is a tension between scholars as to the question of 
whether patents should be protected as property rights.327 Adam 
Mossoff and Simone Rose have stated their view unambiguously: 
“Patents are property.”328 Mossoff argues that the application of 
the Takings Clause to patents has a long historical pedigree 
rather than arising out of modern legal interpretations.329 John 
Duffy agrees that patents “should be treated as a species of 
property.”330 Judge Frank Easterbrook from the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit stated in a scholarly 
                                                                                                     
 326. See id. at 2433 (ruling that “the Hornes should simply be relieved of the 
obligation to pay the fine and associated civil penalty they were assessed when 
they resisted the Government’s effort to take their raisins” even though the 
Hornes retained an economic interest in the seized raisins).  
 327. See generally Michael A. Carrier, Cabining Intellectual Property 
Through a Property Paradigm, 54 DUKE L.J. 1 (2004) (discussing the 
propertization of intellectual property); Stephen L. Carter, Does It Matter 
Whether Intellectual Property Is Property?, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 715 (1993) 
(considering the implications of the debate over whether intellectual property is 
property); Irina D. Manta & Robert E. Wagner, Intellectual Property 
Infringement as Vandalism, 18 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 331 (2015) (analyzing the 
relationship between intellectual property and property law, including as it 
applies to the sanctions regime of intellectual property). 
 328. Adam Mossoff, Patents as Constitutional Private Property: The 
Historical Protection of Patents Under the Takings Clause, 87 B.U. L. REV. 689, 
690 (2007) [hereinafter Mossoff, Constitutional Private Property]; see also 
Simone A. Rose, Patent “Monopolyphobia”: A Means of Extinguishing the 
Fountainhead?, 49 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 509, 515 (1999) (recommending that the 
Patent Act be amended to clarify that “patents are property”); Adam Mossoff, 
The Trespass Fallacy in Patent Law, 65 FLA. L. REV. 1687, 1692 (2013) (“Patents 
have long been identified as property rights in American law.”). 
 329. See Mossoff, Constitutional Private Property, supra note 327, at 700–11 
(discussing nineteenth-century cases recognizing patents as property and 
concluding that this “jurisprudence was quite clear: patents were private 
property rights secured under the Constitution”). 
 330. John F. Duffy, Comment, Intellectual Property Isolationism and the 
Average Cost Thesis, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1077, 1078 (2005).  
TAKING PATENTS 773 
symposium: “Except in the rarest case, we should treat 
intellectual and physical property identically in the law . . . .”331 
One of the leading textbooks in intellectual property explains: 
“Patent law is a property-rights regime . . . .”332 
Shubha Ghosh argues that, while “private property has been 
read to encompass both real and personal property[,] [a]pplication 
to intellectual property or intangible property would occur only 
through analogy.”333 Davida Isaacs mainly criticizes the 
application of the Takings Clause to patents on two grounds: 
first, because patentholders already receive compensation for 
most government uses of patented technologies; second, because 
regulatory claims would allow patentholders to intervene when 
the government limits the circumstances under which they can 
assert claims or the damages they can receive.334 Many scholars 
have emphasized that, rather than focus on the relationship 
between patents and property law, one should ask both with 
regard to the delineation of liability and of proper remedies what 
would advance a utilitarian purpose.335 Meanwhile, Cynthia Ho 
                                                                                                     
 331. Frank H. Easterbrook, Intellectual Property Is Still Property, 13 HARV. 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 108, 118 (1990). 
 332. CRAIG ALLEN NARD ET AL., THE LAW OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 27 (4th 
ed. 2014). 
 333. Shubha Ghosh, Toward a Theory of Regulatory Takings for Intellectual 
Property: The Path Left Open After College Savings v. Florida Prepaid, 37 SAN 
DIEGO L. REV. 637, 667 (2000). 
 334. See Davida H. Isaacs, Not All Property Is Created Equal: Why Modern 
Courts Resist Applying the Takings Clause to Patents, and Why They Are Right 
to Do So, 15 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1, 2–3 (2007) (arguing that “the Takings 
Clause’s command to furnish ‘just compensation’ . . . would in most situations 
simply be superfluous” and “that establishing Takings Clause protection for 
patents could effectively put the government in a policy stasis”).  
 335. See, e.g., Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, A Theory of Property, 
90 CORNELL L. REV. 531, 542 (2005) (arguing that most modern-day property 
scholars base their understandings on utilitarianism rather than natural 
rights); Chiang, Patent Boundaries, supra note 189, at 545 (arguing in favor of 
using a utilitarian basis to decide how to amend claims); David S. Olson, Taking 
the Utilitarian Basis for Patent Law Seriously: The Case for Restricting 
Patentable Subject Matter, 82 TEMP. L. REV. 181, 183 (2009) (“[A] properly 
crafted patent law should provide enough property rights to incentivize the 
socially desirable (efficient) level of innovation, and no more.”); Ted Sichelman, 
Purging Patent Law of “Private Law” Remedies, 92 TEX. L. REV. 517, 530–33 
(2014) (arguing against the view that patent infringement remedies should 
make whole the plaintiff and in favor of a more utilitarian view of each case). 
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describes the view held by a number of individuals in the public 
health context including the U.N. Commissioner for Human 
Rights, that patents are a privilege rather than a property 
right.336 As Michael Davis summed up that position, “[c]alling 
patents property . . . fails to properly analyze the patent 
bargain. . . . Nothing is inevitably or incurably wrong with calling 
the temporary privileges property, but the concept is certainly far 
removed from the general notion of property.”337 
Whoever carries the debate as a theoretical matter, when it 
comes to the Fifth Amendment, “[j]udicial precedent and 
statutory analysis quite clearly support the proposition that 
patents are property. Whether patents share the ‘attributes’ of or 
are ‘of the same dignity’ as property, they are property. They 
therefore satisfy the property prong of an eminent domain 
claim.”338 The Patent Act itself states that “patents shall have the 
attributes of personal property.”339 Even before the recent 
pronouncements by the Supreme Court in Horne,340 the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit stated in Patlex 
Corp. v. Mossinghoff:341 “It is beyond reasonable debate that 
                                                                                                     
One of the authors has argued that one can simultaneously hold a utilitarian 
view of intellectual property and “not see a sharp dividing line between property 
and intellectual property.” See Irina D. Manta, Theory and Empirics: Where Do 
Locke and Mossoff Leave Us, LIB. OF L. & LIBERTY (May 8, 2015), 
http://www.libertylawsite.org/liberty-forum/theory-and-empirics-where-do-locke-
and-mossoff-leave-us (last visited Apr. 22, 2016) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review).  
 336. Cynthia M. Ho, Unveiling Competing Patent Perspectives, 46 HOUS. L. 
REV. 1047, 1053–57 (2009) (citations omitted); see also James Thuo Gathii, The 
Structural Power of Strong Pharmaceutical Patent Protection in U.S. Foreign 
Policy, 7 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 267, 272 (2003) (“In short, referring to patents 
primarily as private property rights is to overshadow their public essence by 
overstating their privateness. Such an overstatement of the privateness of 
patents is exemplified by the enormous limitations placed on the permissibility 
of overriding patents through compulsory and parallel licensing.”). 
 337. Michael H. Davis, Patent Politics, 56 S.C. L. REV. 337, 376 (2004). 
 338. Joshua I. Miller, 28 U.S.C. § 1498(A) and the Unconstitutional Taking 
of Patents, 13 YALE J.L. & TECH. 1, 18 (2010–2011). 
 339. 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2012). 
 340. See supra Part IV.D (discussing the Court’s recognition of patents as 
property in the recent case of Horne v. Department of Agriculture). 
 341. 758 F.2d 594 (Fed. Cir. 1985). 
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patents are property.”342 The Federal Circuit has also referred to 
a patent as “a bundle of rights which may be divided and 
assigned, or retained in whole or part.”343  
The case of Zoltek Corp. v. United States344 raised some 
questions at one point in this context when the Federal Circuit 
suggested that, because a patent holder can still exclude the rest 
of the world from the use of its carbon fiber technology, the 
government’s use of it amounted to mere patent infringement 
rather than a taking.345 The decision by the trial court on this 
point was later vacated, however, “[s]ince the Government’s 
potential liability under § 1498(a) is established, [the court did] 
not and do[es] not reach the issue of the Government’s possible 
liability under the Constitution for a taking.”346 The Supreme 
Court left no doubt in Horne, however, as mentioned, that 
patents are subject to the Takings Clause.347 
B. Patents Are Subject to the Takings Clause 
As most recently demonstrated in Horne, one cannot reject 
the proposition that patents are property in the constitutional 
sense under controlling Supreme Court doctrine.348 Not only did 
                                                                                                     
 342. Id. at 599. 
 343. Alfred E. Mann Found. for Sci. Research v. Cochlear Corp., 604 F.3d 
1354, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (citation omitted); accord Morrow v. Microsoft Corp., 
499 F.3d 1332, 1341 n.8 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (noting that “parties are free to assign 
some or all patent rights as they see fit based on their interests and objectives”); 
Intellectual Prop. Dev., Inc. v. TCI Cablevision of Cal., Inc., 248 F.3d 1333, 1342 
(Fed. Cir. 2001) (discussing property rights divided between grantor and grantee 
in an agreement concerning a patented invention).  
 344. 442 F.3d 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (per curiam).  
 345. See id. at 1353 (“In sum, the trial court erred in finding that Zoltek 
could allege patent infringement as a Fifth Amendment taking under the 
Tucker Act . . . .”). 
 346. Zoltek Corp. v. United States, 672 F.3d 1309, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
 347. See supra Part IV.D (discussing how Horne “reconfirm[ed] the Court’s 
position that patents are the beneficiaries of Fifth Amendment protection just as 
much as pieces of land”). 
 348. See Horne v. Dep’t of Agric., 135 S. Ct. 2419, 2427 (2015) (noting that 
the Takings Clause applies to a “patented invention” as much as it applies to 
“land” (quoting James v. Campbell, 104 U.S. 356, 358 (1882))). 
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the Court recognize in Horne that intangible patents are, in a 
constitutional sense, identical to tangible raisins, it also 
emphatically stated that “[n]othing . . . suggests that personal 
property was any less protected against physical appropriation 
than real property.”349 It therefore follows that patents, like any 
other private property, can be appropriated by the government 
for private use. And if so, such appropriation is forbidden absent 
“just compensation.”350 Yet, two cases seemingly unambiguously 
reject this proposition.351 On closer examination, though, the 
cases that are consistently cited for the proposition that there can 
be no “taking” of patents cannot bear the weight that is too often 
assigned to them. 
In Schillinger v. United States,352 the Supreme Court rejected 
the argument that “the [C]onstitution forbids the taking of 
private property for public uses without just compensation; that, 
therefore, every appropriation of private property by any official 
to the uses of the government, no matter however wrongfully 
made, creates a claim founded upon the [C]onstitution.”353 
Instead, it held that a claim against the United States for patent 
infringement is a claim in tort, rather than in property, and 
therefore is not compensable under the Takings Clause.354 The 
Federal Circuit held firm to this reasoning in Zoltek, concluding 
that sovereign immunity bars claims against the government for 
                                                                                                     
 349. Id. 
 350. Id. (quoting James v. Campbell, 104 U.S. 356, 358 (1882)). 
 351. See Schillinger v. United States, 155 U.S. 163, 172 (1894) (rejecting the 
argument that a government contractor’s use of plaintiff’s patents entitled 
plaintiff to compensation from the government under the Takings Clause); 
Zoltek Corp. v. United States, 442 F.3d 1345, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“In sum, the 
trial court erred in finding that Zoltek could allege patent infringement as a 
Fifth Amendment taking under the Tucker Act, and we reverse.”). 
 352. 155 U.S. 163 (1894). 
 353. Id. at 168. 
 354. Id. at 169. In Schillinger, the patentee sued the U.S. Government for 
actions of its contractor, not those of any government officer acting in his 
original capacity. Id. at 166. Because there was no allegation that the 
Government in any way encouraged the contractor to infringe a patent, the 
Court concluded that there was no contract, express or implied, between the 
plaintiff and the Government on which he could pursue his Fifth Amendment 
claim. Id. at 169–72. 
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patent infringement.355 The Federal Circuit held that § 1498 was 
a limited waiver of sovereign immunity and that a patentee is not 
entitled to any other relief or remedy.356 The conclusion that is 
often drawn from these two cases is that a violation of patent 
rights does not rise to the level of a constitutional Fifth 
Amendment issue.357 
Leaving aside the question of whether either Schillinger or 
Zoltek were correctly decided (and we have our doubts), the rule 
of law announced in those cases is simply not that broad. All that 
these cases stand for is that infringement of a patent is 
insufficient to trigger the Takings Clause.358 But infringement is 
not the only way to interfere with patent rights. One can imagine 
a hypothetical in which the government would reassign 
ownership of a patent from person A to person B. That would be 
qualitatively different from the situation facing the courts in 
Schillinger and Zoltek. As even the defenders of the outcome in 
Zoltek acknowledged  
takings claims could occur if the government changed the 
patent laws so as to decrease the value of the patent when 
enforced against a private infringer—for instance, by 
narrowing the circumstances under which a patentholder 
                                                                                                     
 355. See Zoltek Corp., 442 F.3d at 1349–52 (concluding that “where, as here, 
not all steps of a patented process have been performed in the United States, 
government liability does not exist”). The only exception to this bar according to 
the panel majority is a lawsuit authorized by 28 U.S.C. § 1498, which permits a 
patentee to bring an “action against the United States in the United States 
Court of Federal Claims for the recovery of his reasonable and entire 
compensation for such use and manufacture” whenever the government 
infringes a valid patent. Id. at 1350. 
 356. See id. at 1352–53 (noting that Congress “adopt[ed] a limited waiver of 
sovereign immunity” and thus affirming “the trial court’s conclusion that the 
infringement allegations at bar are precluded by § 1498(a)”).  
 357. See, e.g., Isaacs, supra note 334, at 3 (“Upon considering the modern 
Supreme Court precedent pertaining to federal benefits, it becomes clear that 
patentholders are not entitled to a Takings Clause remedy.”); Mossoff, 
Constitutional Private Property, supra note 328, at 693 (describing the near-
unanimous view among scholars that patents cannot be “taken” under the Fifth 
Amendment).  
 358. See Zoltek Corp. v. United States, 442 F.3d 1345, 1349 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 
2012) (recognizing that “the patentee’s recourse for infringement by the 
government is limited by the scope of the waiver of sovereign immunity 
established by the Congressional consent to be sued”). 
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could assert a claim or by limiting the damages that the 
patentholder could obtain. This could happen where new 
legislation reduces or eliminates subject matter from patent 
protection, narrows patents' scope, or reduces patent 
remedies.359  
Even on its own terms, Schillinger would support the 
proposition that when the government changes or breaches a 
contract (express or implied) with another party, such a breach 
gives rise to a Takings Claim.360 A patent, aside from being a 
property right, is a contract between the patentee and the 
public.361 As Shubha Ghosh notes, “[p]atents are commonly 
understood as a hypothetical contract between the inventor and 
the government resulting in a quid pro quo of innovation for 
exclusivity.”362 Orin Kerr similarly argues that “[t]he cornerstone 
of Congress's scheme to encourage the discovery, development, 
and dissemination of practical knowledge is the unilateral 
contract offer codified by the Patent Act.”363 An applicant, if he 
overcomes the hurdles of the Act “become[s] contractually 
‘entitled to a patent.’”364 The Supreme Court has endorsed the 
conceptualization of a patent as a contract between the patentee 
and the public.365 When the government breaches the terms of 
the contract, including after the patentee has “performed” by 
                                                                                                     
 359. Isaacs, supra note 334, at 2. 
 360. See Schillinger, 155 U.S. at 170–71 
There was no point in the whole transaction from its commencement 
to its close where the minds of the parties met or where there was 
anything in the semblance of an agreement. . . . It may be well to 
notice some of the cases in which the jurisdiction of the Court of 
Claims over implied contracts has been sustained. 
(citing United States v. Russell, 80 U.S. 623 (1871)).  
 361. See David W. Opderbeck, Patent Damages Reform and the Shape of 
Patent Law, 89 B.U. L. REV. 127, 173 (2009) (observing that “a patent 
infringement case is a contract-based claim”). 
 362. Shubha Ghosh, Patents and the Regulatory State: Rethinking the Patent 
Bargain Metaphor After Eldred, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1315, 1316 (2004). 
 363. Orin S. Kerr, Rethinking Patent Law in the Administrative State, 42 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 127, 135–36 (2000). 
 364. Id. at 136 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1994)). 
 365. See, e.g., Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 
150–51 (1989) (describing the patent as a “bargain” between the inventor and 
the public).  
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disclosing his invention and convincing the Patent Office that he 
met all other statutory criteria, the government takes the 
patentee’s property even under the restrictive Schillinger 
standard.366 
There is an additional reason why infringement may not give 
rise to a Takings Clause claim, while a more drastic “adjustment” 
of patent rights would do so. When the government infringes a 
patent, it leaves all other attributes of ownership with the 
patentee.367 The patentee continues to enjoy the right to exclude 
others—just not the government—and to specifically include 
others—by licensing; he continues to have the same scope of his 
patent as he had before; and he continues to enjoy the ability to 
dispose of his property, whether by sale, gift, devise, etc., as he 
sees fit.368 The patent grant as a whole then remains intact, 
albeit with the inability to enforce it against one particular actor. 
This analysis does not extend to situations in Professor Isaacs’s 
hypotheticals,369 or to the regime created by post-issuance review 
proceedings.370  
As we have discussed in Part III, the creation of post-
issuance review proceedings changed the scope of patent rights 
themselves.371 Whereas one boundary of the exclusive right was 
                                                                                                     
 366. Again, the reason the claimant lost in Schillinger can be explained by 
the fact that there was no allegation that the Government itself in any way 
breached his contract. See Schillinger v. United States, 155 U.S. 163, 170 (1894) 
(“It is conceded on both sides . . . that whatever the government did was done 
with the consent of the patentee and under his implied license.”). 
 367. See Robert C. Wilmoth, Toward a Congruent and Proportional Patent 
Law: Redressing State Patent Infringement After Florida Prepaid v. College 
Savings Bank, 55 SMU L. REV. 519, 565 (2002) (“The State can put a patent to 
public use without eliminating the patentee’s ability to use the patent himself.”). 
 368. See id. (“In [the event of patent infringement], a patentee can still 
gather fruits of his labor, prevent nongovernmental competitors from infringing, 
or license or transfer his right to others.”). 
 369. See Isaacs, supra note 334, at 2 (inquiring into what “would occur 
if . . . Congress decided to eliminate protection for genomes . . . if the statutory 
doctrine of equivalents were narrowed, thus removing some competing 
technologies from within the patent scope . . . [or] if Congress decided to reduce 
patent damages for all or some types of technology”). 
 370. See supra Part II.C (elaborating on the post-issuance review 
proceedings established by Congress via the America Invents Act). 
 371. See supra Part III.C (discussing how the new procedures have changed 
the boundaries of vested patent rights). 
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bargained for, the America Invents Act imposed an entirely 
different boundary on patentees. It is true that the boundary was 
not constricted as we would expect in a traditional takings case 
where the government occupies a strip of land that previously 
belonged to an individual, but rather the boundary was 
expanded.372 As we have already explained, however, in the world 
of patents, this is a somewhat meaningless distinction. For 
patentees, broad boundaries may be as dangerous as narrow 
ones.373 Whereas under the latter situation, it would be harder to 
argue infringement by third parties, in the former case, it is more 
difficult to maintain the validity of the patent.374 The end result 
is the same—loss of the previously granted patent right. If 
anything, a broader claim is more problematic to the patentee 
than a narrow claim. A patentee with a claim narrowed by 
government fiat can still enforce it against the—admittedly 
reduced group of—putative infringers.375 A patentee with a claim 
broadened by the government’s meddling may not be able to 
enforce it against anyone if the broadening of the claim results in 
its invalidation.376  
                                                                                                     
 372. See Lee Petherbridge, Positive Examination, 46 IDEA 173, 220 n.34 
(2006) (citing MPEP § 2111 for the proposition that “broadest reasonable 
construction is . . . broader than the interpretation a court construing an issued 
patent would reach . . . .”). 
 373. See Giles S. Rich, The Proposed Patent Legislation: Some Comments, 35 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 641, 644 (1967) (“[T]he stronger a patent the weaker it is 
and the weaker a patent the stronger it is.”).  
 374. See id. (explaining that “the patent with narrow claims . . . is weak as 
protection,” but the strong patent that “contains broad claims” is “weak in that 
it may be easier to invalidate”); Yelderman, supra note 75, at 80 (observing that 
“a claim that is too broad runs the risk of being invalid, and may fare no better 
in litigation than a claim that is too narrow”). 
 375. See Yelderman, supra note 75, at 123–24 (“If applicants care about 
enforcement outcomes, this shift in presumptions can be expected to lead to 
narrower, higher quality claims being filed in the first instance.”). 
 376. See Chiang, Patent Boundaries, supra note 189, at 550–51 (“A 
nominally broad claim that is invalid has no legal scope . . . .”). 
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C. Was Anything Actually Taken? 
The argument we have made thus far is that the AIA 
resulted in significant change to the scope of the rights enjoyed by 
the patentees through the alteration of the boundaries of those 
rights.377 We recognize, however, that there are several 
counterarguments that must be addressed before proceeding 
further.  
1. The Difference Between AIA Mechanisms and Reexamination 
The first question is whether anything actually changed for 
anyone. Prior to the AIA’s enactment, there were two distinct 
proceedings in the Patent Office that allowed for a “second look” 
of already issued patents under the “broadest reasonable 
construction” standard.378 The AIA, it could be said, did nothing 
more than change the procedures under which the patents are 
reviewed and did not modify the actual scope of the right.379 After 
all, the argument goes, everyone who applied for a patent in 1999 
or later would have received a patent subject to the PTO’s ability 
to conduct inter partes reexamination under the looser claim 
construction standards.380 That means that a vast majority of 
unexpired patents would have been granted subject to that 
proviso381 and that the AIA did nothing to undermine patentees’ 
                                                                                                     
 377. See supra Parts III.C–D (discussing the broadening of a patentee’s 
rights under the AIA). 
 378. See supra notes 104–120, 242 and accompanying text (discussing the 
“reexamination procedure[s] established by the Bayh-Dole Act”). 
 379. See supra note 205 and accompanying text (observing that the PTO 
explained that its claim construction standard under the AIA “is consistent with 
what the PTO had been doing” for decades). 
 380. See supra notes 115–118 and accompanying text (discussing this 
“additional reexamination process” created by Congress in 1999). 
 381. Patents are valid for at most 20 years from the date of filing the 
application for the patent. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2012). They may expire earlier for 
non-payment of maintenance fees. Neel U. Sukhatme, Regulatory Monopoly and 
Differential Pricing in the Market for Patents, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1855, 
1881 (2014). As the AIA was enacted thirteen years after the creation of ex parte 
reexamination, one can surmise that most patents have been issued in the 
shadow of the inter partes reexamination process.  
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expectations as to how their patents would be construed 
throughout its lifespan. What is more, all patentees since 1980 
were subject to the same broad claim- construction-based “second 
look” in ex parte proceedings.382 So what, if anything, have the 
patentees lost? 
To answer the above question, we first must disentangle ex 
parte reexamination from inter partes reexamination. As it 
happens, the Federal Circuit addressed the question of why the 
creation of the ex parte reexamination process and its application 
to already issued patents does not present a constitutional 
problem.383 In Patlex Corp. v. Mossinghoff,384 a patentee had his 
patent subjected to ex parte reexamination—a procedure that 
came into being only after the patent issued.385 The patentee 
brought suit alleging that the (then) new procedure effectuated a 
taking of his vested property interest.386 The Federal Circuit 
disagreed. Although the appellate court left no doubt that it 
viewed patents as property rights,387 it concluded that “Congress 
had an important public purpose in mind when it enacted the 
reexamination statute. The statute was part of a larger effort to 
revive United States industry’s competitive vitality by restoring 
confidence in the validity of patents issued by the PTO.”388 Given 
the importance of this purpose, there was no taking of the 
patentee’s property.389 The focus on public purpose was quite 
                                                                                                     
 382. See 4 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 11.07 (2015) (“The 1980 
Patent Act added procedures under which the patent owner or any other person 
may . . . request that the PTO reexamine any claim of that patent on the basis of 
the cited prior art.”). 
 383. See, e.g., MCM Portfolio LLC v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 812 F.3d 1284, 
1291 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (noting that “the constitutionality . . . of the ex parte 
reexamination statute” has been upheld). 
 384. 758 F.2d 594 (Fed. Cir. 1985).  
 385. See id. at 597 (noting that the relevant patents “were granted before 
passage of the reexamination statute”). 
 386. Id. at 598. 
 387. See id. at 599 (“It is beyond reasonable debate that patents are 
property.”). 
 388. Id. at 601. 
 389. See id. at 602–03 (“We affirm the district court in upholding the 
validity of the retroactive statute against Gould’s challenge under the Fifth 
Amendment [Takings Clause].”). 
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appropriate in 1985 because “public purpose” was a touchstone of 
Takings Clause analysis.390 The Supreme Court relied on this 
theory just a few terms prior to Patlex when it held that a 
regulation amounts to a taking only when it “does not 
substantially advance legitimate state interests, or denies an 
owner economically viable use of his” property.391 As discussed 
above, though, the “substantial state interest” test has now been 
explicitly overruled by the Supreme Court,392 and, therefore, 
Federal Circuit’s reasoning in Patlex cannot be relied upon to 
uphold the AIA’s regime. 
There is an additional reason why Patlex does not foreclose 
the argument presented here. In Patlex, the Federal Circuit 
viewed the ex parte reexamination procedure as resolving a 
dispute between the government and the patentee, rather than 
between two private parties.393 Reexamination was not a 
substitute for litigation but truly a “second look” or a “quality 
check” on the PTO’s initial decision to issue the patent.394 That 
view cannot be squared with inter partes processes—whether 
now obsolete reexamination or the newly created IPR or 
CBMR.395 This is why when Congress created the first inter 
partes procedure—inter partes reexamination—it made it 
                                                                                                     
 390. See supra notes 296–299 and accompanying text (observing the Court’s 
emphasis on “justice and fairness” in Takings Clause cases). Agins and its 
“legitimate state interest” was announced in 1980 and not overruled until 2005. 
See Lingle v. Chevron USA Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 548 (2005) (holding “that the 
‘substantially advances’ formula [of Agins] is not a valid takings test” and 
concluding “that it has no proper place in [the Court’s] takings jurisprudence”). 
 391. Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980). 
 392. See Lingle, 544 U.S. at 540 (“We conclude that [the substantially 
advances] formula prescribes an inquiry in the nature of a due process, not a 
takings test, and that it has no proper place in our takings jurisprudence.”). 
 393. See Patlex Corp. v. Mossinghoff, 758 F.2d 594, 604 (Fed. Cir. 1985) 
(noting that “the grant of a valid patent is primarily a public concern”). 
 394. See id. (“The reexamination statute’s purpose is to correct errors made 
by the government, to remedy defective governmental (not private) action, and if 
need be to remove patents that should never have been granted.”). 
 395. See supra Part II.C.2 (discussing these post-issuance review procedures 
established by the AIA). For the sake of readability, in this section we will refer 
only to IPRs, rather than to both IPRs and CBMRs. However, our arguments 
about IPRs apply a fortiori to CBMRs because, due to the breadth of CBMRs, 
they have circumscribed patent holders’ property rights even more so than IPRs 
have. 
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available only prospectively.396 This is also why five out of eleven 
Federal Circuit judges recently acknowledged, when writing in 
dissent, that IPRs are fundamentally different from ex parte 
reexamination, as they do not bear “examinational hallmarks,” 
instead having “similarities to district court litigation.”397 One of 
the five judges who joined the dissent, and for good measure 
wrote her own, was Pauline Newman398—the author of the 
opinion in Patlex.399  
But if Patlex does not serve to undermine our argument that, 
at least for patents that had been issued by September 16, 2011, 
the AIA’s effective date,400 the AIA worked a taking, then what 
about the fact that even prior to that date, patents were subject 
to a different, but still inter partes, proceeding—inter partes 
reexamination? Why should it matter what form the inter partes 
review takes so long as the patentee was on notice that the patent 
could be subject to an adversarial process involving another 
private party and applying the “broadest reasonable” claim 
construction standard? The answer to that question can be found 
in the dissents in Cuozzo.  
As the dissenting judges noted, the reason the Federal 
Circuit has previously endorsed “broadest reasonable” claim 
construction in “second look” proceedings is attributable to the 
fact that, whether ex parte or inter partes, the reexamination 
procedures were in fact “examinational,” that is they allowed for 
continued negotiations between the applicant and the Patent 
Office.401 As we have explained, and as the dissent noted, “the 
broadest reasonable interpretation standard is a useful tool, prior 
to patent issuance, for clarifying the metes and bounds of an 
                                                                                                     
 396. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.913 (2001) (providing that a person may only apply for 
inter partes reexamination if the patent was “issued from an original 
application filed in the United States on or after November 29, 1999”). 
 397. In re Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC, 793 F.3d 1297, 1301 (2015) (Prost, 
C.J., Newman, Moore, O’Malley, & Reyna, JJ., dissenting). 
 398. See generally id. at 1303–06 (Newman, J., dissenting). 
 399. See generally Patlex Corp. v. Mossinghoff, 758 F.2d 594 (Fed. Cir. 
1985). 
 400. Leahy–Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 6(f)(2)(A), 125 
Stat. 284, 311 (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 311 (2011)). 
 401. Cuozzo, 793 F.3d at 1300 (Prost, C.J., Newman, Moore, O’Malley, & 
Reyna, JJ., dissenting). 
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invention during the back-and-forth between the applicant and 
examiner when claims are not yet in their final form.”402 The 
signal feature of a proceeding where “claims are not yet in their 
final form”403 is the ability to amend the claims until they are in 
their final (and hopefully acceptable to the PTO) form.404 It is 
that unfettered ability to amend that differentiates 
examinational from adjudicatory proceedings.405 
In creating IPRs, Congress was aware that inter partes 
reexamination functioned on the examinational model, with the 
patentee being able to amend his claims as necessary to obtain a 
reexamination certificate.406 Congress consciously chose to 
“convert inter partes reexamination from an examinational to an 
adjudicative proceeding”407 where the opportunity to amend 
would be much more cabined. The PTAB itself recognized this 
congressional purpose when it held that “[a]n inter partes review 
is neither a patent examination nor a patent reexamination” but 
is “a trial, adjudicatory in nature [which] constitutes 
litigation.”408 This different approach significantly affected the 
patentee’s ability to amend his claims during the course of an 
IPR.409 The ability to amend during IPR is very limited even in 
theory410 and, as discussed in Part IV, ephemeral in practice. The 
                                                                                                     
 402. Id. 
 403. Id. 
 404. See In re Prater, 415 F.2d 1393, 1405 (C.C.P.A. 1969) (“Claims yet 
unpatented are to be given the broadest reasonable interpretation consistent 
with the specification during the examination of a patent application since the 
applicant may then amend his claims . . . .”). 
 405. See generally In re Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC, 778 F.3d 1271, 1287 
(Fed. Cir. 2015) (Newman, J., dissenting), substituted opinion, 793 F.3d 1268 
(Fed. Cir. 2015), reh’g en banc denied, 793 F.3d 1297 (Fed. Cir. 2015). 
 406. See id. at 1300 (observing that “Congress decided to start anew and 
establish new post-grant review procedures, including IPR, in the AIA”). 
 407. H.R. REP. NO. 112-98, pt. 1, at 46 (2011). 
 408. Google Inc. v. Jongerius Panoramic Techs., LLC, IPR2013-00191, 
Docket No. 50, at 4 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 13 2014). 
 409. See supra notes 248–256 and accompanying text (discussing the 
ramifications of the fact that the ability to amend is “absent in the AIA-created 
procedures”). 
 410. There is no right to amend the claims in an IPR. A patentee who wishes 
to amend the claims must seek permission of the Board to do so. 37 C.F.R. 
§ 42.221(a) (2015). The petitioner is limited to only one motion. Id.; 35 U.S.C. 
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practical inability to amend was also noted by the dissenting 
judges in Cuozzo and obliquely recognized even by the Federal 
Circuit’s panel majority.411 This radical shift from an 
examinational to an adjudicatory model, which deprives the 
patentee of the actual ability to continue its pas de deux with the 
PTO, is what separates inter partes reexamination from IPR.412 
Therefore, the AIA-mandated switch was not a mere technical 
change to the procedures employed for the “second look” review 
but a fundamental change to the review itself. 
Given the fundamental differences between IPR and both ex 
parte and inter partes reexamination, it cannot be gainsaid that 
on September 16, 2011, patent holders lost significant property 
rights in their existing patents.413 This conclusion is bolstered by 
the fact that a mere IPR request, even prior to the PTO’s decision 
on whether to institute a full-blown trial on the matter, has 
significant effects on the value of the underlying patent and even 
on the price of the stock of the company that owns that patent.414 
Such a market reaction was not observed when reexamination (of 
                                                                                                     
§ 316(d)(1) (2012). Additional motions to amend are not permitted unless on a 
joint petition of a patentee and a patent challenger or for other “good cause 
showing.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.221(c); see also 35 U.S.C. § 316(a)(11) (providing that 
“the Director may, for good cause shown, extend the 1-year period by not more 
than 6 months”).  
 411. See In re Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC, 793 F.3d 1268, 1278 (Fed. Cir. 
2015) (recognizing that “the opportunity to amend is cabined in the IPR 
setting”); id. at 1287–88 (Newman, J., dissenting) (“There is no right of 
amendment in these new post-grant proceedings, and motions to amend are 
rarely granted.”). 
 412. See id. at 1287 (“A critical difference between the standard procedure of 
examination of pending applications, and these post-grant proceedings, is the 
ready pre-grant availability of amendment of the claims.”). 
 413. See supra Part III.D (discussing the effects of the AIA post-issuance 
review proceedings). 
 414. See, e.g., supra notes 237–240 and accompanying text (discussing the 
relationship between AIA post-issuance review proceedings and financial 
markets); see also Joseph Walker & Rob Copeland, New Hedge Fund Strategy: 
Dispute the Patent, Short the Stock, WALL STREET J. (Apr. 7, 2015), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/hedge-fund-manager-kyle-bass-challenges-jazz-
pharmaceuticals-patent-1428417408 (last visited Apr. 6, 2016) (discussing the 
strategy of “filing and publicizing patent challenges against pharmaceutical 
companies while also betting against their shares”) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review). 
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either kind) was requested.415 This is evidence that the market 
also considers IPR to be different from inter partes review in kind 
rather than in mere procedure. For all these reasons, we conclude 
that AIA-created IPR proceedings changed the boundary of 
established patent rights and took from the patentees both the 
settled scope of the patent and the presumption of validity that 
attached thereto. 
2. The Inchoateness Problem 
Another objection to the claim that IPRs constitute a taking 
is the fact that if the patentee is successful in an IPR, he would 
have in fact lost nothing—and possibly gained something from 
having his patent re-confirmed before a skeptical tribunal.416 
Thus, the argument goes, at best the AIA created an inchoate 
taking, and, until a patent is actually invalidated, patentees have 
little about which to complain. We disagree. 
Though the mere creation of post-issuance review procedures 
did not in and of itself invalidate any patent, it did change the 
scope of existing patents and greatly diminished their value.417 As 
a result of these new procedures coming into being, patentees 
have had reduced opportunities to license their patents or to 
obtain fees commensurate with the pre-AIA value of the 
patents.418 This has affected all patentees whether or not their 
                                                                                                     
 415. See Robert Greene Sterne et al., Reexamination Practice with 
Concurrent District Court Litigation or Section 337 USITC Investigations, 11 
SEDONA CONF. J. 1, 20 (2010) (noting that patent owner’s stock price was subject 
to significant fluctuations but only after a “significant decision” such as an 
“[o]ffice action rejecting some or all of the claims of the patent in 
reexamination,” but making no mention of price fluctuation upon the mere 
decision to reexamine the patent).  
 416. See Joshua D. Sarnoff, Bilcare, KSR, Presumptions of Validity, 
Preliminary Relief, and Obviousness in Patent Law, 25 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. 
L.J. 995, 1024–25 (2008) (“[O]nce a patent issues from an ex parte or inter 
partes reexamination, the factual inference from the grant to its validity may be 
significantly stronger than from the initial grant.”). The same logic would apply 
to IPRs and CBMRs.  
 417. See supra notes 237–240 and accompanying text (noting, for instance, 
that “the stock market reacted very negatively to the news that an IPR was 
requested on a particular patent”). 
 418. See Richard Baker, Guest Post: America Invents Act Cost the US 
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own patents have ever been subjected to a full-blown IPR trial.419 
Similarly, all patents, whether or not subject to the PTAB process 
have had the boundaries of their right affected by the creation of 
IPR and CBMR. The meaning of the claim has permanently 
changed for all patents irrespective of whether they have been 
haled before the PTAB.420 For these reasons, IPRs are not a mere 
inchoate problem that might only spring into being once a patent 
is subjected to trial and then invalidated. Rather, the very 
existence of IPRs has drastically affected the scope of patent 
rights.421 
D. A Regulatory or a Physical Taking? 
Once it is accepted that patents, like other real or personal 
property, are subject to the Takings Clause and that the 
post-issuance proceedings changed the scope of the property right 
previously enjoyed by the patentee, the next question to ask is 
whether the regime created by the AIA resulted in a physical or a 
regulatory taking. If it was a physical taking, then, absent 
compensation (which did not exist here), the action was 
unconstitutional per se.422 On the other hand, if this was 
potentially a regulatory taking, then a more complex analysis is 
required to determine the scope of loss and whether, if 
uncompensated, the loss rises to a level of unconstitutional 
                                                                                                     
Economy over $1 Trillion, PATENTLYO.COM (June 8, 2015), 
http://patentlyo.com/patent/2015/06/america-invents-trillion.html (last visited 
Apr. 6, 2016) (noting that “US Patents have lost 2/3rds of their value since the 
AIA was passed in 2011,” and a further drop of “10-15% [is expected] in the next 
year or two”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 419. See id. (stating that the drop off in value is primarily due to “the impact 
of the AIA IPR procedure”). 
 420. See supra notes 373–376 and accompanying text (discussing the “broad 
boundaries” imposed on patents by the AIA, and noting that these boundaries 
“may be as dangerous as narrow ones”). 
 421. See Baker, supra note 418 (noting “the impact[s] of the AIA IPR 
procedure”). 
 422. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 434 
(1982) (noting that, where there “is a permanent physical occupation of 
property, our cases uniformly have found a taking to the extent of the 
occupation”). 
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violation.423 In some sense, the very question posed by this Part 
may seem silly. How can a patent—an incorporeal property—be 
physically taken in the first place? Almost by definition, non-
physical property cannot be physically taken. And yet, in our 
view, the answer is not so simple. Indeed, we conclude that the 
AIA-created IPR may in fact contain analogies to a physical 
taking of patents that existed prior to September 16, 2011 and 
that there is an even stronger claim that a regulatory taking 
occurred.  
1. The Argument for a Physical Taking 
As an initial matter, in our view it may be incorrect to 
conclude that patents can never be physically taken because they 
themselves are not physical property rights. Returning to our 
earlier hypothetical, if the government were to simply re-assign 
patent rights from person A to person B, it would be hard to 
argue that such an action is any different from a situation where 
the government takes land—or for that matter raisins—from one 
person to give it to another.424 If one is to consider seriously the 
Supreme Court’s view that a “patent for an invention is as much 
property as a patent for land [and] [t]he right rests on the same 
foundation, and is surrounded and protected by the same 
sanctions,”425 then it may follow that a physical taking can occur 
with respect to each. But did a physical taking occur when 
Congress created IPR? 
                                                                                                     
 423. See supra Part IV.D (discussing the regulatory taking analysis 
undertaken in Horne v. Department of Agriculture). 
 424. Indeed, Congress has recognized as much. In 1954, Congress passed the 
Atomic Energy Act, Pub. L. No. 703, 68 Stat. 919 (1954), forbidding issuance of 
patents “for any invention or discovery which is useful solely in the utilization of 
special nuclear material or atomic energy in an atomic weapon.” 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2181(a) (2012). Furthermore, Congress mandated cancellation of already 
issued patents to this technology, essentially transferring the ownership to the 
public. See id. § 2181(b) (“Any rights conferred by any patent heretofore granted 
for any invention or discovery are hereby revoked . . . .”). However, Congress 
provided for “just compensation” for the patent owners. Id. 
 425. Consol. Fruit-Jar Co. v. Wright, 94 U.S. 92, 96 (1876). 
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To arrive at the conclusion that IPRs work a physical taking 
of existing patents, we must, admittedly, work by analogy. In our 
view, boundary changes with respect to a patent issued for an 
invention are similar to boundary changes with respect to a 
patent issued for a parcel of land.426 The government has the 
power to work some changes, but it must compensate the owner. 
As the Supreme Court held in Loretto, the government cannot 
simply change the boundaries of the property owner’s rights 
without triggering the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment.427 And let there be no mistake, the patent boundary 
changes affected by the AIA are indeed permanent changes to the 
patent boundaries. Though the IPRs come with estoppel 
provisions,428 these provisions apply only to a specific petitioner—
and even then incompletely.429 Other challengers can continue to 
seek and obtain IPRs against a patent multiple times over.430 The 
specter of IPR hovers over all patents no matter how many times 
they were reexamined, were challenged in district or appellate 
courts, or benefitted from the PTAB’s confirmation of the validity 
of the patent.431 Even if the threat of IPR could not be 
characterized as a “permanent” invasion of a patentee’s property 
interest—though in our opinion it should be so characterized— 
repeated, albeit nominally “temporary,” invasions of property 
rights can be as much of a taking as a permanent occupation 
can.432 Following this logic, courts may come to view the AIA’s 
                                                                                                     
 426. For a similar view, see Baker, supra note 418 (analogizing reversal of a 
previously granted patent to a reversal of a deed).  
 427. See Loretto, 458 U.S. at 435 (explaining that depriving the owner of a 
part of his property such as changing the boundaries of his property rights, 
works a taking). 
 428. See 35 U.S.C. § 315(e) (2012) (providing that “petitioner in an inter 
partes review of a claim . . . that results in a final written decision . . . may not 
request or maintain a proceeding before the Office with respect to that claim on 
any ground that the petitioner raised or reasonably could have raised during 
that inter partes review”). 
 429. See Dolin, Dubious Patent Reform, supra note 3, at 935–44 (discussing 
the ability to evade estoppel provisions). 
 430. See id. at 943 (discussing “stacking” IPR petitions). 
 431. See id. at 944 (“Given the structure of the IPR review process, there is 
little to nothing that the patentee can do to prevent such abuse.”). 
 432. See Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 511, 519 
(2012) (finding that “takings temporary in duration can be compensable”). 
TAKING PATENTS 791 
changing of patent boundaries as a permanent invasion of the 
patentee’s rights akin to a physical taking of land. 
2. The Argument for a Regulatory Taking 
Even if one is not convinced that the AIA worked the 
equivalent to a physical taking, which is per se unconstitutional 
unless compensated, one still needs to consider the possibility 
that it worked a regulatory taking. The argument for this 
position, in our view, is quite strong.  
It is well established that, even though the government often 
performs actions that diminish the value of property, not every 
such action triggers the compensation requirement of the Takings 
Clause.433 Except in cases where “regulation . . . deprives land of 
all economically beneficial use,” there is no per se rule requiring 
compensation.434 Instead, under Penn Central, the courts are 
required to engage in an “essentially ad hoc and fact intensive” 
balancing inquiry with particular attention to “the economic 
impact of the regulation, its interference with reasonable 
investment backed expectations, and the character of the 
governmental action.”435  
As earlier studies have shown, the economic impact of 
AIA-created post-issuance proceedings is quite severe.436 Not only 
does the existence of these processes affect the value of patents 
for which review has been requested, it affects the value of 
patents even pre-request. It has been reported that the value of 
patents has dropped by two-thirds since and because of the AIA, 
                                                                                                     
 433. See Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922) (“Government 
hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to property could not be 
diminished without paying for every such change in the general law.”); 
Radioptics, Inc. v. United States, 621 F.2d 1113, 1126 (Ct. Cl. 1980) (recognizing 
that “not every interference with or encroachment upon a private property right 
by the Government is entitled to compensation under the [F]ifth 
[A]mendment”). 
 434. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027 (1992). 
 435. E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 523–24 (1998) (plurality opinion) 
(quoting Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 175 (1979)). 
 436. See supra Part III.D (discussing the AIA’s “dramatic effects in the ‘real 
world’”). 
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with a further drop of 10%–15% expected in the next few years.437 
Additionally, it is now significantly harder for patentees to 
license their patents,438 and the value of the licenses actually 
agreed to has been significantly reduced post-AIA.439 The simple 
reason for this unwillingness to pay for a license is the putative 
infringer’s knowledge that all patents have been significantly 
weakened through tinkering with their scope and the abolition of 
the robust presumption of validity.440 Alternatively, the putative 
infringer or licensee knows that he can drive down the price of 
the license by mere threat to tie up the patentee or his business 
partners in protracted IPR proceedings during which time no one 
would be imprudent enough to take a license to the patent in 
question.441 Thus, the economic impact of the AIA-created regime 
on the patentees has been rather dramatic. 
For the same reason, the AIA-created procedures 
significantly interfered with patentees’ “investment-backed 
expectations.”442 Patents are obtained in expectation of profit.443 
                                                                                                     
 437. See Baker, supra note 418 (reporting “a dramatic drop in the average 
price per patent over the three year period, with values dropping 61% from 
$422,286 per patent to $164,232,” and predicting “that patent values will drop 
another 10-15% in the next year or two”). 
 438. See Michael Gulliford, If Patent Reform Is Meant to Starve Patent 
Trolls, Why Is It Feeding Them Instead?, IPWATCHDOG (Sept. 8, 2014), 
http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2014/09/08/if-patent-reform-is-meant-to-starve-
patent-trolls-why-is-it-feeding-them-instead/id=51067 (last visited Apr. 6, 2016) 
(criticizing the “unintended consequences” of patent reform under the AIA) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 439. See Jack Lu, Patent Market Dynamics and the Impact of Alice and the 
AIA, IPWATCHDOG (May 17, 2015), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2015/ 
05/17/patent-market-dynamics-aia-and-alice/id=57728 (last visited Apr. 6, 2016) 
(reporting a “crash” in the patent market post-AIA) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review). 
 440. See Case, supra note 20, at 67–68 (arguing that the “AIA shakes 
investor confidence. . . . [It also] shifts the risk–reward balance and will slow the 
growth of America's innovative economy”); Lu, supra note 439 (discussing the 
AIA’s impacts on the patent market). 
 441. See Dolin, Dubious Patent Reform, supra note 3, at 944–47 (discussing 
how “post-issuance review proceedings” can be “used to either settle scores with 
patent owners or to strong-arm companies into more favorable licensing deals”). 
 442. Baker, supra note 418. 
 443. See F. Andrew Ubel, Who’s on First?—The Trade Secret Prior User or a 
Subsequent Patentee, 76 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 401, 414 (1994) 
(observing that “a primary goal of the patent system is to promote the 
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Patentees invest not just their time, efforts, and money into 
inventing, but also into more mundane activities like convincing 
the PTO that their invention is worth exclusive rights that come 
with the grant of a patent. Patentees pay attorneys’ fees, filing 
fees,444 maintenance fees,445 etc., all in the hope of reaping some 
economic reward from their inventive activity. They construct 
their arguments and draft their claims with an expectation that a 
person of ordinary skill in the art would understand the claims 
and either steer clear of their property, allowing patentees to till 
that field themselves or pay toll for the ability to work the 
invention.446 They also expect that once granted, the patent right 
would not be easily upset and would only be cancelled upon the 
showing of clear and convincing evidence.447 This assurance of 
“strong title rights” may well be the most valuable part of a 
patent grant. The AIA, however, did away with all that. Whereas 
the patentees carefully crafted their language and addressed it to 
a reasonable artisan, the Patent Office requires that claims be 
reviewed under a different standard—one that is contrary to the 
patentee’s “investment backed expectations.”448 
We acknowledge that even post-AIA, the value of patents was 
not reduced to zero, and therefore (if viewed through the 
regulatory takings prism), the AIA-created mechanism is not a 
                                                                                                     
advancement of science and useful arts by rewarding the inventor of new things 
with an exclusive right to profit from the invention”). 
 444. For information on average legal fees to obtain a patent, see generally 
AM. INTELL. PROP. L. ASS’N, 2015 REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY I-85–I-87 
(2015). 
 445. For information on fees associated with patent application, issuance, 
and maintenance, see generally USPTO Fee Schedule, USPTO, 
http://www.uspto.gov/learning-and-resources/fees-and-payment/uspto-fee-schedule 
(last updated Jan. 1, 2016) (last visited Apr. 6, 2016) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 446. See, e.g., Multiform Desiccants, Inc. v. Medzam, Ltd., 133 F.3d 1473, 
1477 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“It is the person of ordinary skill in the field of the 
invention through whose eyes the claims are construed.”). 
 447. See 35 U.S.C. § 282(a) (2012) (“A patent shall be presumed 
valid. . . . The burden of establishing invalidity of a patent or any claim thereof 
shall rest on the party asserting such invalidity.”); Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. 
P'ship, 131 S. Ct. 2238, 2242 (2011) (holding that “§ 282 requires an invalidity 
defense to be proved by clear and convincing evidence”). 
 448. Baker, supra note 418. 
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per se taking like the one in Lucas.449 Nonetheless, the courts 
have not insisted on a total loss of value to find a taking under 
Penn Central, instead requiring significant reduction in value as 
a result of the government’s actions.450 Certainly, the AIA did 
greatly diminish the value of all patents.451 This loss of value is 
not really matched by any benefits that have accrued to the 
public as a result of the new law. While the authors of the Act 
thought it would “provide[] more certainty, and reduce[] the cost 
associated with filing and litigating patents,”452 the exact 
opposite has happened.453 Thus, the “nature of the government’s 
action” was not to broadly benefit the public but to make it easier 
for some patent infringers to avoid having to bear the costs of 
their infringement.454 This was accomplished by transferring 
those costs to the patentee and, in the process, destroying 
significant amount of value in issued patents. 
The upshot is that whether viewed as a physical taking or as 
a regulatory taking, the AIA worked a great diminution of patent 
values for all patentees. It did so by changing vested pre-existing 
rights and upsetting expectations backed by significant 
investments, all without conferring (even judging by the Act’s 
authors’ own metrics) any clear benefit on the public. For these 
                                                                                                     
 449. See supra Part IV.C.4 (discussing the taking at issue in Lucas). 
 450. See, e.g., Cienega Gardens v. United States, 331 F.3d 1319, 1353–55 
(Fed. Cir. 2003) (ruling that a statutory amendment that voided the claimant’s 
right to pre-pay a government mortgage was a compensable taking, simply 
because it was possible that a 96% diminution in return on investment would 
result); Yancey v. United States, 915 F.2d 1534, 1542 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (holding 
that a 77% loss of the value of a flock of turkeys after a quarantine regulation 
was enacted was a compensable taking). 
 451. See Baker, supra note 418 (“According to Scott Bechtel of AmiCOUR IP 
Group, an experienced patent broker, ‘US Patents have lost 2/3rds of their value 
since the AIA was passed in 2011.’”). 
 452. H.R. REP. NO. 112-98, pt. 1, at 42 (2011). 
 453. See generally Dolin, Dubious Patent Reform, supra note 3 (discussing 
how the AIA increased costs and reduced certainty).  
 454. See Terry Ludlow, Technology Patent Licensing Trends in 2015 and 
Beyond, CORP. COUNS. (Apr. 17, 2015), http://www.law.com/sites/ 
articles/2015/04/17/technology-patent-licensing-trends-in-2015-and-beyond/#ixz 
z3js6qPOfP (last visited Apr. 6, 2016) (“Look for more holdout behavior from 
defendants as there is little incentive to settle early. Before making any 
settlement offers, patents will be thoroughly tested through IPR filings . . . .”) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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reasons, the application of the Act’s post-issuance review 
provisions to patents granted prior to the effective date of the Act 
constitutes a taking within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment. 
VI. Conclusion 
At this point, only legislative or judicial intervention can 
ensure that pre-existing property rights in patents are not 
trampled by the AIA’s new procedures. There is no doubt that, in 
the context of the AIA, procedural transformations have effected 
a substantive change in the rights of patent owners.455 The 
government is free to modify its procedures for future patent 
applicants, but owners whose rights vested before the AIA 
became effective should not be subject to this kind of drastic 
restriction of their investment-backed expectations. Allowing this 
to occur, and thus creating a legal regime that permits retroactive 
tectonic shifts, also sets a dangerous precedent for other areas of 
intellectual property and property law such as to disincentivize 
innovation and reliance on the law.  
The government has only a limited number of solutions to 
the identified constitutional violation. One of them, and the 
easiest, is not to make pre-AIA patents subject to the post-AIA 
procedures. Another is to roll back those procedures for everyone, 
by requiring the PTO to use the same claim construction 
standards as have always been used by the district courts. This 
approach has the support of nearly half the Federal Circuit 
judges, and of a number of legislators, albeit for reasons 
unrelated to the issue of takings. Last, the government can 
provide just compensation to patent owners whose rights vested 
before the AIA became effective. This last option could, however, 
quickly become prohibitively expensive if enough owners come 
forward, and the calculation of the proper levels of compensation 
will present its share of headaches. Hence, we have cause to 
believe that adopting one of the first two options will be the most 
plausible solution to the problem we present in this Article. 
                                                                                                     
 455. See generally Irina D. Manta & Cassandra Burke Robertson, Secret 
Jurisdiction, 65 EMORY L.J. (forthcoming 2016) (discussing the relationship 
between procedural and substantive rights in the national security context).  
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Additionally, Congress should take care to avoid such 
constitutional conundrums in future legislation that has the 
potential to affect retroactively the rights of intellectual property 
and property owners. 
